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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
All facts contained in the Statement of Facts are referenced to the proceedings 
below. The cited record of proceedings below shall be referred to in the following 
manner: 
References to the Record Pleadings and Entries at Numbered Pages of the Record 
Index (RL at ) 
References to the Official Trial Transcript (T. at ) 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from a final Judgment and Decree, and from rulings on motions 
for Summary Judgment, and to Amend Pleadings entered by the Third District Court of 
Summit County, State of Utah, arising from Appellant's Complaint to adjudicate a real 
property boundary and declare the respective property interests of the Parties. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On May 30, 2001, Appellants/Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown and Marilyn R. Brown 
(hereinafter "the Browns") commenced an action against Lee Jorgensen and other 
unknown defendants (hereinafter "Jorgensen"), by filing a Complaint which sought to 
quiet title in a certain parcel of real property located in Summit County, Utah (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Subject Property"). For a description of the Subject Property see 
Complaint at RI 0001-0006. On June 14, 2001, Jorgensen answered the Browns' 
Complaint, and filed a Counterclaim which sought to quiet title in the Subject Property 
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in 12 Jorgensen's favor. During the pendency of the action, the Parties filed motions for 
Summary Judgment and Partial Summary Judgment under theories of Boundary by 
Acquiescence and Record Title, respectively. On April 6, 2002, the Court, Judge Robert 
K. Hilder presiding, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Browns on the 
third and fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence standard. (See Ruling and 
Order, RI at 0281-0284.) The matter proceeded to trial on the remaining elements, and 
was tried to the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, without a jury, on the 31st day of March, 
2004, and the 1st day of April, 2004. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
At the conclusion of the Trial, Judge Lubeck granted a judgment awarding the 
Subject Property to Jorgensen. The Trial Court's decision is contained in its 
Memorandum Decision (see RI at 0481-0492) a copy of which is included in the 
Addendum. On June 14, 2004, the Browns filed a Post-Trial Motion to Amend the 
Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence, which motion was denied by the Trial Court, the 
Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on July 15, 2004, (see RI at 0565-0568). On 
August 2, 2004, the Trial Court entered formal Findings of Fact, the Judgment (see RI at 
0569-0573); a copy of which is included in the Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Browns are the record owners of a parcel of real property located in 
Summit County, Utah, and which is more particularly described as set forth in the 
Complaint (hereinafter referred to as the "Brown Parcel"). (See also Trial Exhibits, RI 
0479-0480.) 
2. The Browns formally took title to the Brown Parcel in 1971 (T. at 89 line 
13-16); however, the Brown Parcel had been continuously in the Brown Family since at 
least the 1940's. (T. at 90 lines 19-21.) 
3. Jorgensen is the record owner of certain real property located adjacent to 
the Brown Parcel in Summit County, Utah, and which is more particularly described in 
the Complaint and Trial Exhibit 5 (hereinafter referred to as the "Jorgensen Parcel"). (T. 
at 15.) 
4. Jorgensen and his partner, Dean W. Rowell, originally acquired record title 
ownership of the Jorgensen Parcel in 1979. (T. at 14-16.) 
5. In 1986, Jorgensen's partnership with Dean W. Rowell was dissolved, at 
which point Jorgensen became the sole owner of the Jorgensen Parcel. (T. at 15.) 
6. Located near the northeastern border of the Jorgensen Parcel is a fence 
which runs in a southeasterly direction roughly along the southern border of the Brown 
Parcel (hereinafter referred to as the "Fence"). (T. 93 lines 12-22.) 
7. Sometime between 1943 and 1946, Appellant Thomas E. Brown and other 
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family members assisted their father with the construction of the Fence (T. at 93), which 
was originally composed of cedar posts, netting, and barbed wire. (T. at 91.) 
8. Although some of the Fence is located on the Brown Parcel, the Fence 
crosses the Jorgensen Parcel and in so doing separates the Subject Property from the 
Jorgensen Parcel. The Subject Property is an area of approximately 6.94 acres of land 
and consists of a strip running westerly along the Fence for more than 1900 feet to which 
Jorgensen has record ownership but Browns' claim by doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence.. (Trial Exhibit 7; T 112 lines 10-16) 
9. Since the time of its original construction, the Fence has been maintained, 
repaired, and improved, but has continually remained in the same basic position and 
location. (T. at 73-76, 94, 97.) 
10. The Fence has at all times since its creation been visible from 
either the Brown Parcel or the Jorgensen Parcel, though at various points it might have 
been leaning downward or covered by sagebrush in certain places. (T. at 22, 23, 51, 53-
55, 59, 65, 69, 71, 73-76, 100, 101, 167, 168.) 
11. The Browns have always considered the Fence to be the true and correct 
boundary line and possessory demarcation between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen 
Parcel. (T. 94, 117; Trial Exhibit 15.) 
12. In conjunction with this belief, the Browns have used the Subject Property, 
for farming, pasturing, and other agricultural purposes, for the grazing of livestock and 
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for the raising and harvesting of crops, for family recreation and improvements of the 
property. (T. 72, 94, 95, 96, 97, 113, 114, 115.) 
13. There is also an irrigation ditch located on the Subject Property which the 
Browns have consistently maintained, culverted, and improved. (T. at 95, 114.) Neither 
Jorgensen nor his predecessor Tracy Wright ever used the irrigation after Fence was 
constructed. (T. 34, 302.) 
14. From the date the Fence was originally constructed in 1943 or 1946 until 
July of 1999, neither Jorgensen nor any of his predecessors in interest claimed or 
attempted to claim possession or occupation of the Subject Property. (T. 17, 18, 19, 34, 
101,302,304,305.) 
15. From the date of original construction of the Fence in 1943 or 1946 until 
twenty years later (1966), Browns and their predecessors occupied the Subject Property 
without objection or challenge of such occupation, use and possession. (T. 17, 18, 19, 24, 
101,109,119.) 
16. From the time Jorgensen purchased the Jorgensen Parcel in April 
of 1979 until July of 1999, a period of more than twenty years, Jorgensen voiced no 
objection to the Browns' continued use, occupancy and possession of the Subject 
Property. (T. 24 lines 10-20; 89 lines 2-12.) 
17. In 1971, the Browns or their building contractor engaged the firm of Bush 
and Gudgel to prepare a metes and bounds site plan of the Brown Parcel to construct a 
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house. (T. at 107 to 120 and particularly 119, and Trial Exhibit 6.) 
18. The 1971 Bush and Gudgel site plan (Trial Exhibit 6) was not a survey and 
it was not prepared for the purpose of identifying the record property lines of the Brown 
Parcel and it specifically did not make any reference to the Fence. (T. at 108, 119.) 
19. The Browns did not understand that the Bush and Gudgel site plan (Exhibit 
6) showed a property line different from the Fence originally constructed in the 1940fs, 
and the Browns continued to use, occupy and possess the Subject Property. (T. 108.) 
20. In or about 1994, and in anticipation of possibly selling a portion of his 
property, Jorgensen commissioned a diagram of the Jorgensen Parcel by Wally France. 
(T. 16-17.) This was not a survey. (T. 258-261.) 
21. The 1994 diagram commissioned by Jorgensen was not a survey, but was 
scaled off of an aerial photo (T. 260.) 
22. Wally France showed Browns the 1994 diagram, and that the diagram 
showed the property line cutting through Brown's home. Brown concluded that the 
survey must be erroneous, which it was later shown to be. (T. 102, 103; 258-261; Trial 
Exhibit 8, a copy of which is included in the Addendum.) 
23. Despite the results of the 1994 diagram, and despite Jorgensen's newly 
discovered knowledge that the Fence was not the record boundary line between the 
Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel, it was not until July of 1999, approximately five 
(5) years after commissioning the 1994 diagram, and more than twenty (20) years after 
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acquiring ownership of the Jorgensen Parcel, that Jorgensen for the first time voiced 
objection to the existence and location of the Fence. (T. at 87-89.) 
24. In or about July of 1999, more than 20 years after first acquiring ownership, 
Jorgensen drafted and delivered a note to the Browns informing the Browns that the 
Fence had been improperly built on the Jorgensen Parcel, and instructing the Browns to 
remove the Fence. (T. at 29, 88-89; Trial Exhibit 21.) 
25. The 1999 Jorgensen letter was the first communication between the Parties 
regarding the Fence, and was the first time Jorgensen had ever voiced objection to the 
existence of the Fence and its suggested presence on the Jorgensen Parcel. (T. at 89.) 
26. After receiving the 1999 letter, the Browns immediately contacted 
Jorgensen in an attempt to resolve the dispute. (T. at 88-89.) 
27. In response to Jorgensen's letter, the Browns commissioned a survey 
of the Brown Parcel in the Fall of 1999, the results of which confirmed that Jorgensen's 
1994 survey was erroneous, but also showed that the Subject Property was according to 
the record a part of the Jorgensen Parcel. (T. at 112. 
28. Thereafter, the Browns filed this action to quiet title to the Subject Property 
in themselves under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (See Complaint at RI 
0001-0006.) 
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29. After trial, the Trial Court found that the Browns had satisfied three of the 
four required elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence; however, the Trial 
Court rendered a judgment in favor of Jorgensen based upon a finding of lack of mutual 
acquiescence. (Memorandum Decision RI at 0490). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court should have granted the Browns' Motion to Strike 
Jorgensen's Affidavit in Opposition to the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Jorgensen Affidavit was legally insufficient because it did not comply with Rule 56(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, the Trial Court was in error to consider the 
Jorgensen Affidavit, and summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the 
Browns. 
2. The Trial Court erred by holding that there was no mutual acquiescence in 
the Fence as the boundary between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. The 
Fence was originally created as a boundary between the properties, and has been 
recognized as such by the parties, their predecessors and others in the community since 
that time. The evidence showed no objection by Jorgensen's predecessors between 1943 
or 1946 and 1966, and use of the land up to but not beyond the Fence by both owners thus 
mutual acquiescence was established for that period. Moreover, Jorgensen failed to 
object to the existence or location of the Fence until more than twenty (20) years after 
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acquiring ownership of the Jorgensen Parcel. Thus, mutual acquiescence was established 
for this period also. Therefore, the Browns have satisfied the second element of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
3. The Trial Court erred by holding upon Judgment that the Fence separating the 
Brown Parcel from the Jorgensen Parcel did not satisfy the first element of the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. The Fence was a clearly visible monument or structure, and 
the parties at all relevant times considered the Fence to be the true boundary line between 
the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. Therefore, the Trial Court should have found 
after trial that the Browns had established the first element of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. 
4. The Trial Court should have granted the Browns' Motion to Amend the 
Pleadings to include the issue of prescriptive easement. In this case the evidence 
necessary to establish the existence of a prescriptive easement is substantially the same as 
was required to prove boundary by acquiescence. As such, both issues were inherently 
and simultaneously tried before the Trial Court, and Jorgensen failed to object at any time 
to the introduction of the prescriptive easement issue during those proceedings. 
Moreover, because the issues of prescriptive easement and boundary by acquiescence are 
so similar, the merits of the action would have been subserved and Jorgensen would have 
suffered no surprise or prejudice. Therefore, the Trial Court should have granted 
Plaintiffs' motion and amended the pleadings to conform to the evidence of a prescriptive 
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easement. 
5. The Judgment of the Trial Court is invalid to the extent that it awards 
Jorgensen a judgment of costs. In Utah, a party claiming his costs must within five days 
after the entry of judgment file with the trial court a duly verified memorandum of costs 
pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Jorgensen failed to 
comply with this requirement; a fact acknowledged by Jorgensen in his Reply 
Memorandum to his Motion for Summary Disposition. As such, the Judgment of the 
Trial Court is invalid in this regard. 
6. The Judgment of the Trial Court is invalid to the extent that it purports to 
adjudicate all claims of all other persons who may claim by, through, or under the 
Browns. The doctrine of claim preclusion bars a Trial Court from adjudicating claims 
over which it has not acquired subject matter jurisdiction, and which are different from 
those already adjudicated in a prior proceeding. As it stands, the Judgment of the Trial 
Court violates the doctrine of claim preclusion, and is invalid to the extent that it does so. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BROWNS5 MOTION TO STRIKE JORGENSEN'S AFFIDAVIT IN 
OPPOSITION TO THE BROWNS5 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE BROWNS WAS PROPER ON THE 
FIRST AND SECOND ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
The Trial Court erred by admitting or considering Jorgensen's Affidavit in 
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Opposition to the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment, and by refusing to grant 
summary judgment in favor of the Browns. In Utah, it has been clearly established that 
summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions of the 
parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 
1983); UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). An affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence. Dairy 
Product Services v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81, [^54, 13 P.3d 581; Norton, 669 P.2d at 
859; UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e). An affidavit that contains mere conclusory allegations which 
are unsupported by a statement of relevant surrounding facts, is legally insufficient to 
preclude summary judgment. Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
2001 UT 25, ]f36, 21 P.3d 198; Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 
1186 (Utah 1989). The Jorgensen Affidavit contains Jorgensen's personal opinions, 
conclusions, and speculations as opposed to allowable specific statements of fact as 
mandated by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Jorgensen Affidavit also violates 
several of the Utah Rules of Evidence by offering information that is neither relevant to 
the issue of boundary by acquiescence, nor admissible under the rules of hearsay. It is for 
these reasons that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike should have been granted and the Jorgensen 
Affidavit should have been stricken by the Trial Court; and, thus summary judgment 
should have been granted in favor of the Browns. 
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A. The Affidavit Of Lee Jorgensen Filed In Opposition To The Browns9 Motion 
For Summary Judgment Should Have Been Stricken Because It Fails To 
Comply With Rule 56(e) Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, 
The Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen (the "Jorgensen Affidavit") filed on January 18, 
2002, in opposition to the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment fails to comply with 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and is, therefore, inadmissible. 
Generally speaking, "an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must 
set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in order to show that there is 
a genuine issue for trial." Dairy Product Services, 2000 UT at [^54, 13 P.3d at 594 
(emphasis added); Norton, 669 P.2d at 859; See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(e). An affidavit that 
contains "mere conclusory allegations in a pleading, unsupported by a recitation of 
relevant surrounding facts, [is] insufficient to preclude...summary judgment." Franco, 
2001 UT at 1{36, 21 P.3d at 208; Chapman, 784 P.2d at 1186; see also Dairy Product 
Services, 2000 UT at {^54, 13 P.3d at 594 (stating that "[a]n affidavit that merely reflects 
the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of 
fact"). The Norton case is helpful in this analysis. 
In Norton, the Plaintiff filed suit claiming damages as a result of a car accident 
with the Defendant. Norton, 669 P.2d at 857. During the proceedings, the Plaintiff filed 
an affidavit in opposition to the Defendant's motion for summary judgment wherein the 
Plaintiff attempted to assert allegations of fraud or misrepresentation. Id. The trial court 
held that the Plaintiffs affidavit was not admissible in evidence because it was legally 
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insufficient and therefore, could not be considered on summary judgment. Id. at 859. 
The court reasoned that the Plaintiffs statements were largely conclusory in form, and 
that they did not state with sufficient specificity the facts supporting the Plaintiffs 
allegations. Id. 
In the instant case, the Jorgensen Affidavit is replete with the affiant's opinions, 
conclusions, and speculations as opposed to containing specific statements of fact as 
required by Rule 56(e). The Jorgensen Affidavit ( a copy of which is included in the 
Addendum) states that Jorgensen "owns and holds fee simple record title" to the property 
in dispute. (RI 0114, f 2.) This statement is wholly conclusory in nature, and purports to 
assert a claim that was and remains to be the very issue in dispute between the Parties, 
and which was then undecided by the Trial Court. Indeed the facts supported a finding 
that the Browns had acquired title to the Subject Property prior to Jorgensen ever 
acquiring title to the Jorgensen Parcel. The Jorgensen Affidavit also states that "the fence 
remnants appeared to be meaningless" (RI 0116, ^  12), and that "Brown had been 
endeavoring to obliterate all traces of the old Ditch Road." (RI 0117, \ 19.) These 
statements are based on Jorgensen's personal opinion, are conclusory in nature, and are 
unsupported by any statements of fact as required by Rule 56(e). The Jorgensen Affidavit 
states that "the fact the old fence remnants included net wire strongly suggests the old 
fences were intended for sheep control - perhaps to keep sheep grazing in the area..." (RI 
0119, f^ 25.) These statements are speculative in nature, and are pure conjecture created 
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by Jorgensen. As such, they are inadmissible under Rule 56(e) as they are unsupported by 
specific factual statements, and/or the affiant's personal knowledge. The Jorgensen 
Affidavit further states that "[t]he Ditch Road's access from the Brown Canyon 
highway...is the most valuable part of Affiant's Property..." (RI 0119, f 28.) This 
statement is also composed entirely of Jorgensen's opinion, and is unsupported by facts of 
any nature. 
In addition to the foregoing, the Jorgensen Affidavit also contains numerous 
statements that run contrary to the Utah Rules of Evidence, making them inadmissible 
under Rule 56(e). Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that "[e]vidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible." Relevant evidence "means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." UTAH 
R. EviD. 401. In reference to the Jorgensen Parcel (not the Subject Property), the 
Jorgensens' Affidavit states that Brown "has never operated livestock on the Property nor 
leased it for grazing..." and that Brown "gave permission...to persons unknown to the 
Affiant for use of the Property for grazing livestock." (RI 0116, f 11.) The Jorgensen 
Affidavit also states that "[a]ll real property taxes related to the Property...have been paid 
by [Jorgensen]." (RI at 0119, If 29.) These statements are entirely irrelevant to the 
subject matter of this action, as they contribute nothing to the various elements of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is not 
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concerned with the payment of property taxes, nor does it give credence to unknown 
persons who might have used property the ownership of which is not in dispute. As such, 
these statements are not admissible into evidence as they have no tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
any more or less probable. 
The Jorgensen Affidavit is also inadmissible as it contains a significant amount of 
hearsay. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 
UTAHR. EVID. 801. Generally speaking, hearsay is inadmissible. UTAHR. EVID. 802. In 
the Jorgensen Affidavit, Jorgensen states: (1) that he "was..informed by a person...that 
such survey stakes marked the Property's Northeast boundary line..." (RI 0114, ^  5) 
(emphasis added); (2) that he "was assured by agents...that these old fence remnants were 
all within the Property..." (RI at 0115, f 8) (emphasis added); (3) that he "was advised 
efforts might be taken by Brown to build a fence cutting off access up the old Ditch 
Road..." (RI 0116, % 14) (emphasis added); (4) that he was "informed that...Brown 
erected a...fence along the Brown's Canyon highway..." (RI 0117, f 16) (emphasis 
added); and (5) that he had been "advised...that the downhill flat portion [the Jorgensen 
Property] had been used...as a lambing area." (RI 0119,125) (emphasis added). Each 
evidentiary assertion listed above is based upon declarations of someone other than 
Jorgensen while that person was not testifying at trial, and each was offered into evidence 
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to prove the truth of the matter which it asserts. Moreover, Jorgensen's knowledge of the 
truth or falsity of these statements is speculative at best, and none of these assertions is 
supported by factual evidence of any kind. As such, these statements constitute hearsay, 
run contrary to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and are, therefore, 
inadmissible. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Jorgensen Affidavit fails to comply with Rule 56(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It should, therefore, be stricken from the record, 
and be held inadmissible in connection with Jorgensen's opposition to the Brown's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Absent the assertions of the Jorgensen Affidavit, 
Summary Judgment should have been granted in favor of the Browns. 
B. The Browns9 Motion For Summary Judgment Should Have Been Granted 
Because The Trial Court Improperly Admitted And Considered The Affidavit 
Of Lee Jorgensen Filed In Opposition To The Browns9 Motion For Summary 
Judgment. 
Because the Trial Court improperly admitted and considered Lee Jorgensen's 
Affidavit in Opposition to the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Browns' 
Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted. Generally speaking, summary 
judgment is proper "if the pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions of the parties show 
that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Norton, 669 P.2d at 859; UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). When a 
trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is being reviewed, the trial court's legal 
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decisions are given no deference,, but are reviewed strictly for correctness. . 
Services920Q0UTatV5. H P3datJ>8/. Again, me .W/«»H . M |» 
regard. 
A s1 pte\ ii nisi v mentioned, the Plaintiff in Norton filed suit claiming damages as a 
result of a car accident with the Defendant. Norton, 66c! I'. M *i( K>K I he tii.il i < »m I 
granted summary judgment in favor ofthe ueienu, • ° had 
entered into an agicvmcnl lei a'un •<*l>ndni-* ium iiabilkj. la. On appeal, if 
l'l uMilT claimed that summary judgment was improperlv granted because an affidavit 
submitted by the Plaintiff created factual issues as to whether tne Deteiidiiiil oMamcd I he 
release by fraud or misrepresentation, Id The 1 llah Supremi i 'ouri disagreed with the 
Plainn ' -on of the trial court, reasoning that the 
I ; HI ff s affidavit was legally insufficient, and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to 
summary judgment as a result, Id 
In the case at hand, \.„ r.- nkvw no 
Jorgeiisens , \ 11 Ma till JppoMin/ the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment. As set 
forth in the previous section of this Brief, the Jorgensen Affidavit was legally insufficient 
because it failed to comply with Ruk 3(>(v;)... »;., , „,„ . ...i. See 
Dairy Product Scrvu t ' ' \<>nofu 669 P.2d at 859, UTAH 
if! ( I / I'. !'H n i \ I ill :j v, v, [lie 'J rial Court should not have considered the Jorgensen 
^liidavit when ruling on the issue of summary judgment. However, because I lie 11 M! 
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Court did consider the Jorgensen Affidavit despite its legal deficiencies and fallacies, the 
Trial Court's subsequent denial of the Browns' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
improper. For these reasons, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the 
Browns on all four elements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
II. THE PURPOSE AND EXISTENCE OF THE FENCE, COMBINED WITH 
JORGENSEN'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE FENCE OR PROVE 
THAT HIS PREDECESSORS OBJECTED TO THE FENCE, 
ESTABLISHES THE PARTIES' MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE IN THE 
FENCE AS THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE BROWN PARCEL 
AND THE JORGENSEN PARCEL. 
The Trial Court was incorrect in concluding after trial that the Browns had not 
established mutual acquiescence in the Fence as the boundary line between the Brown 
Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. Mutual acquiescence in a line as a boundary requires 
that both parties recognize the specific line, and that both parties acquiesce to the line as 
the boundary. Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App 145, f 19, 24 P.3d 997; Wilkenson 
Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 1999 UT App 366, [^8, 993 P.2d 229. Mutual 
acquiescence is a highly fact-dependent question, and may be established by a party's 
silence, or by a party's failure to object. RHN Corp., 2004 UT at f25,96 P.3d at 941; see 
also Mason, 2001 UT App at f20, 24 P.3d at 1004. Despite his knowledge of the Fence, 
and despite the Browns' open and notorious use of the Subject Property up to the Fence 
line, Jorgensen failed to object to the location of the Fence for twenty consecutive years. 
This being the case, Jorgensen's acquiescence in the Fence as the true boundary marker is 
implied by his conduct. Moreover, the Brown Family's use of the Subject Property from 
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the mid-1940's to 1979, combined with Jorgensen' • \AIi*,., .. .
 v. .;:., . s 
predecessors in interest had objected M. UM , .i,..^ vumi uc iu 
establisl .;I.M i . .. .»„.. , v .:-..,, -i--*-. - *< / iHished long before Jorgensen took 
tnlc in • ;- s m jJ7y. And ^ boundary K acquiescence, once estabhs 
does not disappear simply because a subsequent landowner is not aware ol its esislence. 
Dah! In\ I o. >. Hughes, 2004 I.;
 Mr, -^ reasons that the 
Trial (ourt erreii in cunuuum: ' •  * ; '• J not established the requirement of 
A. Mutual Acquiescence Has Been Established Because The Parties Have Al vi a\ s 
Treated The Fence As A Boundary Line Between The Properties, And 
Because Jorgensen Failed To Object To The Fence For Twenty Consecutive 
Years. 
1 he BiovviiN and Inipensen have mutually acquiesced in the Fence as the boundary 
line between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel because the i UKY *\ y 
created as a boundary, and Jorgensen and his predece . = : - • ' • 
such. Generally speaking, nmlii.il .n quinsectiiv in a a^  a boundai> has two 
ivqun ement ^ III IIi.J Imth parties recognize the specific line; and (2) that both parties 
a CqU | e s c e t o t | i e j j n e a s fog boundary. Mason °00* T r r \pr „; • , * 
™" </M>//, 1999 UT App at 1[8, 9V3 i . -H- \ict-
.ent question' when1 "lit"' I,IIHIMWIHT\S actions with respect to a particular line may 
. thai [Hit landowner impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the 
demarcation between the properties," RUN Corp,, 2004 I (I al )\14, *H) I" >J .il "M ", «,. * 
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also Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199, 120 (Utah 1973) (stating that "the test to establish 
the boundary by acquiescence necessarily need not be based on mutual intent.") (internal 
quotations omitted). As such, acquiescence may be established by a party's silence, or by 
"the failure of a party to object to a line as a boundary." RHN Corp., 2004 UT at [^25, 96 
P.3d at 941; see also Mason, 2001 UT App at [^20, 24 P.3d at 1004; Lane, 505 P.2d at 
1199 (stating that u[a]cquiescence is...synonymous with 'indolence,' or 'consent by 
silence'"). The Mason case lends itself well to this analysis. 
In Mason, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants were adjoining landowners. Mason, 
2001 UT App at ^[2-8, 24 P.3d at 1000. A fence comprised of cedar posts, barbed wire, 
and netting separated the Plaintiffs' property and the Defendants' property. Id. at f 8. The 
fence had been erected at least sixty years prior to the time the Plaintiffs and Defendants 
acquired their respective parcels. Id. at f 21. The Plaintiffs and their predecessors 
believed the fence marked the boundary line between the two properties and treated it as 
such by grazing livestock up to, but not beyond, the fence. Id. at [^5. As it was, however, 
the fence did not mark the true boundary line between the properties, but extended far 
into the Defendants' parcel, providing the Plaintiffs with a portion of the Defendants' 
property upon which to graze their livestock. See Id. at [^6. At one point in time, a survey 
was conducted which revealed to the Defendants the location of the true property line 
between the parcels. Id. Despite the survey results, however, neither the Defendants nor 
their predecessors objected to the existence of the fence, or the Plaintiffs' use of the 
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property at issue. Id. at f20. Sometime thereafter, the h.nniil5 . ..*.: .*. ^ - « i |nn I 
title claiming ownership of the property unciei ;;;L *. ;. • nuiescence. 
Id. at *|8, The Court toun*. ...... • • • * >.u*i'u d each of the necessary elements 
ol llie ikuJiim „ iii<i li second element of mutual jcquieseence. Td w\ ^ l 9 ^1 Tn 
r *- Hussion of mutual acquiescence, the court reasoned that both parties reeogin - * 
existence of the fence, and that the Defendants sileiu * u as iiiuttj:! I iniily 
acquiescence despite ihc 1 r : liscovery of the true property line. Id. at 
in the case at hand, the Browns and Jorgensen have recognizee 
separating their respective properties. - \s discuss* \i n Ihr1 n\ h wis section of this Brief, 
IV! v I in >wn assLsici: onstruction of the Fence in the mid-1940's 
> i i 111NI flic Browns have continued to maintain and improve the Fence ft. -m ;h;1; ,sme 
until the present date, (T, 07.) The Browns have also contin... *•'- *• - >••;• 
placed the Subject Property to prom.. f * !n -.-* from the time of its 
orign.v.i *rw- ih1 i T. 94.) Jorgensen has also clearly 
11 vnmiized the Fence line. Jorgensen admittedly saw the Fence when he first purchased 
the Jorgensen Parcel, and has been aware of its existence hi MM (itJ hitk' l\n \ .hi i I * \ I 
(RI0486.) 
In acddiliiiii tu tlv.ii leeognition and awareness of the Fence, the Parties have also 
acquiesced in the Fence line as the possessory demarcation between the Brown Parcel .mti 
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the Jorgensen Parcel. The Browns originally built the Fence for the purpose of 
establishing a common boundary between the Brown Parcel and what is now the 
Jorgensen Parcel. (T. 94.) Moreover, the Browns have always perceived and treated the 
Fence as the true boundary line between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel (Id), 
as have others in the area. (T. 42.) The Browns' original purpose behind the construction 
of the Fence, combined with their continued efforts and actions to maintain and use the 
Subject Property up to the Fence, show that the Browns have, at all times, believed the 
Fence to be the true property line separating the Brown Parcel from the Jorgensen Parcel. 
Jorgensen's acknowledgment of the Fence, though less apparent, is equally 
established. Jorgensen acquired ownership of the Jorgensen Parcel and knowledge of the 
Fence line in 1979 (T. 14-16, 23), yet he voiced no objection to the existence or location 
of the Fence until 1999 - a period of twenty consecutive years. (T. 89.) The fact that 
Jorgensen thought he had discovered the true property line in the 1994 is a relevant factor 
in this analysis, but it is by no means dispositive on the issue of mutual acquiescence. See 
Wilkenson, 1999 UT App at |13 , 993 P.2d at 232 (stating that "knowledge of the true 
boundary is relevant to a determination of whether a party acquiesced in a particular line 
as the boundary"); see also Mason, 2001 UT App at f 19, 24 P.3d at 1004. The Trial 
Court, in its Memorandum Decision, stated that "[if Jorgensen] believed and acquiesced 
in the notion that the Fence was the boundary, he would not have commissioned a 
survey...[t]hat act, though not conveyed directly to [the Browns], shows a lack of 
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: ticNeence " * Kl 0-1^
 v 
I: htal eourf N ruling is erroneous for ai ic.; v n . ^ b based on a 
false premise. Jorgensen ,KI* • ; i 994 ^arve>^ not for the pi irpose 
ol in\ e\f igatit»|j ci disputing the Fence and/or the true boundary line between the 
properties, but did so out of a potential interest in selling his property to prospective 
buyers, (T, 16-17,) The trial court, even ackne.,-. K\«i."'d ill n l n'rnsen's 1994 "survey" 
was commissioned oi.: ^ his property. (R. at 0486.) Jus! 
because Jorgensen may have commission a survey does not necessarily mean he 
challenged the Fence as a boundary. Even if Mr. France's diagram could N onsidcinl .? 
survey,, parties involved in real estate transact ion surveys to 
facilitate the u ansae i ion t i if; Imam iii)11 in the absence of any property line disputes, By 
in i means docs llie 1994 diagram establish that Jorgensen objected to the existence *. .::. 
Fence. 
Second, the trial court ruled ilui . Ia< I < >l acquiescence need not be 
commutikaiv • -• - • \ interest. If the trial court's analysis is adopted 
'•'i Iiii1" i:ourf „ (hen any self-serving or unrelated manifestation of non •acquiescence will be 
sufficient to defeat a boundary by acquiescence claim I"M e sample il ;i 1 Vlnidant tells 
his wife, "I sure don I ..*. . <:. * -. • - w the riirht spot," without 
commuwcahm» in %oine wciy (lie objection to the opposing property owner, that woi ild 
si iffer i inder the trial court's analysis. However, I Jtah law requires a party to 
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communicate its non-acquiescence to the other party in interest to be valid in defeating a 
boundary by acquiescence claim. "[Rjecord property owners are not required to take legal 
action or otherwise "oust" someone adversely occupying their property to maintain their 
legal rights in their property. They must only take some action manifesting that they do 
not acquiesce or recognize the particular line, e.g. a fence, as a boundary between the 
properties.55 Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781 at [^20. If Mr. Jorgensen really 
thought the Subject Property was his all along, as he now claims, why did he allow the 
Browns to continue to occupy it? Why did he say nothing to the Browns for over twenty 
(20) years? Fairness and the substantial policy behind the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence mandate that this Court reject the trial court's analysis and continue to 
require the direct communication of non-acquiescence to the other party in interest in 
order to defeat a boundary by acquiescence claim. 
Finally, after obtaining the 1994 diagram results and discovering that the Fence did 
not constitute the true boundary line between the properties, Jorgensen still voiced no 
objection to the Browns as to their ongoing use of the Subject Property for an additional 
five (5) years, but instead remained entirely impartial and silent only to object to the 
existence of the Fence when he again desired to sell the Jorgensen Parcel in 1999. 
"[Acquiescence] may also be shown by silence, or the failure of a party to object 
to a line as a boundary.55 RHN at [^25. By inference any objection must be communicated 
or evidenced to the opposing or affected property owner by word or deed. Jorgensen5 s 
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uduet under the circumstances is demonstrative ui ih * ,a L\V ; i 
boundary and the Browns ' claim to the ^u.*.,^ •. * •• ensen a iweniy -
year silence and inact ^nce his acquiescence in the Fence as the 
t» ip< i HHnitIan i i i• between the Jorgensen Parcel and the Brown Parcel. 
B. Jorgensen's Failure To Introduce Evidence Showing I'hat His Predecessors 
Objected To The Fence Is Sufficient To Establish That Mutual Acquiescence 
Had Already Been Established Long Before Jorgensen Took title To The 
Jorgensen Parcel In 1979. 
"i.Miftnt!! i^rgensen has failed to offer evidence of any nature showing thai tiic 
Brown family had not already acquired ownership ol iiic Ntihj \\ h o p r r h ii'^ii \ iin 
doctrine of bouniiaiv .*\ acquics^..
 t * Jorgensen himself 
purchased i In1 Iniiiiiisen I 'anvl in 1979. As a matter of km H« I Mali, a "boundary by 
in quiescence, once established, does not disappear because subsequent owners n« 
ignorant of its existence." Dahl, .200* .
 M l . - * *,, . {JIN 
Corp..200-1
 f • • 1111111111 i |)« 111•< 11 ; 111 established boundary by 
;iv;i|ii!csceii( i i, iiu • malr.l bv a subsequent discovery of the true record boundary by 
one of the parties"). 
u[B]ecause acquiescence may be inferred Inn il"1 i;ni<im\ II^I \ actions, this 
absence oi uiit , • •»• subjective belief concerning the boundary is 
«
 !
.v. » ^ "U^r of mutual acquiescence. See, e.g., Staker, 785 P.2d at 420-21 
(basing a finding of mutual acquiescence where there was no positn e e\ icleihr itni n.i* 
parties acknowledged a fence line as a boundary on the fact that '[tjhere [was] no 
indication in the record that any predecessor in interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent 
with the belief that the fence line was the boundary'). This especially holds true where 
the owner is deceased and unable to testify." RHN Supra at ]f26. 
The facts in the Dahl case are very similar to the facts in the case before the Court. 
In Dahl, the Plaintiffs and Defendants owned adjacent parcels of land. Dahl, 2004 UT 
App at %2, 101 P.3d at 831. The Plaintiffs parents had originally acquired the Plaintiffs 
parcel of land in 1923, and subsequently transferred ownership of said parcel to the 
Plaintiffs. Id. at \2. The Defendants did not acquire their parcel until 1998. Id. From 
approximately 1925 to 1965, a fence stood between the two parcels, and traversed land 
that was contained in the legal description of the Defendants' parcel. Id. at ^3. During 
this time, the property owners regarded the fence as the true boundary line, despite the 
fact that it actually provided the Plaintiffs with continued use of a portion of the 
Defendants' parcel that was enclosed by the fence. Id. at [^10. By the time the 
Defendants had purchased their property in 1998, however, the fence had deteriorated. 
Id. at p . In 2001, the Plaintiffs brought an action seeking to quiet title to the portion of 
the Defendant's parcel that was previously used by the Plaintiffs and enclosed by the 
fence. Id. at %A. The Plaintiffs claimed that the presence of the fence from 1925 to 1965 
was sufficient to have created a boundary by acquiescence. Id. The Court ruled in favor 
of the Plaintiffs, reasoning that boundary by acquiescence had previously been 
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established, and that the subsequent disappearance of the fence was (iicrclon: indn/iiiif. 
Mat l f lL • 
Under the circumsta 1 h ; • - • h. 1 d a • m ired ownership of the Subj ect 
Pr*»paly long )» '"ir lonjensen purchased the Jorgensen Parcel and subsequently 
discovered the true b«_.. • y line between the properties, As discussi - ; 
Biown family originally erected JUL . v IK, boundary marker 
between the Bro\ 'he Jorgensen Parcel. (T. 94.) Jorgensen,, 
t acquire ownership oi the Jorgensen Parcel until 1979, more than iini'v 
11 ()) years after the original construction of the Fence, {'! I •' If", ,l I' i n i • i »I it" i »i» 
Fence was originally constructed, ihe lho'< n rimir in nidii. m< Appellants, put the 
1 ..* continually maintained the fence as a proper! 
oj oy ,• . Ihuse who lived in the area acknowledged that the> uiuu ; ^md 
that the Fence was the common boundary between the . . i u,! 
Parcel (T. 42), and at trial Joigenscii l.nU I U» ofTcr c\ I am kind that **k> 
predecessor HI HIII-II-SI Jul not consider the Fence to be the common boundary o '1_-A 
vi.-v objected in any way to the location and existence of the Fence, or to UIL Uio^us' 
jul notorious use of the Subjcvi i:iwpcii\ v> - n liiintily Natisfied each 
of the necessary el c *; a • n £ • • i c •. i u i escence, including the 
etetitcitf of mutual:«irquiescen.ee, long before Jorgensen became the record owner oi w hat 
is now the Jorgensen Parcel. More specifically,, the Brown, family occupied (lie Subject 
-33-
Property up to the Fence line for a period of time in excess of twenty (20) consecutive 
years, and did so without objection from their adjacent landowners. (T. 17, 18, 19, 34, 
101, 302, 304, 305.) These facts, combined with Jorgensen's failure to offer evidence 
that his predecessors in any way objected to the Fence line and/or the conduct of the 
Brown family, are sufficient to establish mutual acquiescence along with the Brown 
family's undisputed ownership of the Subject Property long before Jorgensen acquired the 
Jorgensen Parcel. Under these circumstances, Jorgensen's untimely discovery that the 
Fence was not the record property line in 1994 is of no consequence and cannot alter the 
boundary by acquiescence that had been established years before Jorgensen purchased the 
Jorgensen Parcel in 1979. See RHNCorp., 2004 UT at | 31 , 96 P.3d at 943; see also Dahl 
Inv. Co., 2004 UT App at fl 1, 101 P.3d at 832. 
In light of the foregoing, the Browns and Jorgensen, as well as their respective 
predecessors in interest, have mutually acquiesced in the Fence as the boundary line 
between the Brown Parcel and the Jorgensen Parcel. Therefore, the Trial Court erred to 
the extent that it did not rule in favor of the Browns on this issue. 
III. THE FENCE SEPARATING THE BROWN AND JORGENSEN PARCELS 
SATISFIES THE FIRST ELEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE BECAUSE IT CONSTITUTES A VISIBLE 
MONUMENT ERECTED AND MAINTAINED AS A BOUNDARY. 
The Trial Court was somewhat ambivalent on this issue. In one portion of the 
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court stated that the Browns had satisfied this 
element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (See RI 0488, 0490.) However, 
other portions of the Memorandum Decision imply that the Browns had not satisfied this 
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element because they allegedly erected and maintained the Fence only to contain 
livestock and protect a ditch, but did not think of the Fence as a boundary line between 
the properties. (See RI 0488, 0491) (Contra RI 0485.) Therefore, to the extent that the 
Trial Court found that the Browns did not erect, maintain, and continually view the Fence 
as a "boundary" between the properties, the Browns appeal. 
The Hum us: and their predecessors in interest, have satisfied the first requirement 
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because they have occupied the Subject 
Property up to a visible line marked - ., *>- ; . - =. *• * 
boundary between Hie pmpn In ? ** 'ish uoundary bv acquiescence in Utah, 
a I,nidi *\\ tier must first show that they have occupied the property in dispute "up to a 
visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings." A7M c *>rp M, 
96 P.3d at 941 - 0-tn*< v w - .,. ,„ . - ^ S; Englert v. 
Z a n e , Svf<\ r :w • \ • < «ll "! IP ;'11 | ' """ I" Utah law does not, however, require thai 
iiclat y line be a single, uninterrupted structure. Orton, 970 P.2d at » ...e \citing 
Olsen v. Park Daughters Tnv Co, 511 P 2d 14::> I I, .Utah I" .. In; • i 
Supreme Court has bi oadlj lonstiueti me "c MI * *•' I • i I * i i, , "i inii .mlexl to mean a 
'"iceogni/abli \^\\w\ ,il I« HI fix), icy nl ,\w\ character3 which has been acquiesced in as a 
boundary." Englert, 848 P.2d at \W Hie Supreme Court has further stated that to be 
considered sufficiently visible, "[a] claimed boundary xww
 ; !.M^VH ^ l 
to observant .-.;.. peculaiivc. id. (citing 
/ iio(< i •" r " ' *>44. 946 (Utah i%6)) (internal quotations omitted). 
The Or/o/2 case involved a fence which had separated two parcels o! ..IM, . 
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several years. Orton, 970 P.2d at 1255. By mutual consent of the adjoining landowners, 
the front portion of the fence was removed and replaced with a common lane. Id. The 
owners occupied their respective properties up to the common lane and both used the 
common lane. Id. at 1257. In a subsequent boundary by acquiescence dispute, the court 
held that the fence and common lane satisfied the first element of the doctrine despite the 
fact that a portion of the fence was no longer present. Id. The court further found that the 
owners of the two lots viewed the fence line as the boundary between the parcels. Id. 
Like the Orton case, Brown and Jorgensen have each occupied their respective 
properties up to the Fence, as have their predecessors in interest. (RI 0488.) The Fence 
has remained in the same basic position since the time of its creation (T. 59-60, 65, 69, 
74), and has been a clearly observable boundary marker between the Brown Parcel and 
the Jorgensen Parcel. (T. 53, 69.) Jorgensen even admitted to seeing the Fence posts 
when he originally purchased the Jorgensen Parcel in 1979. (T. 23) (RI 0486.) The fact 
that small portions of the Fence might have fallen into disrepair over the course of the 
Fence's existence is insufficient to defeat Brown's claim. See Orton, 970 P.2d at 1257. 
Under the circumstances, the Fence at issue has been clearly open to observation, and 
constitutes a definite object separating the Brown Parcel from the Jorgensen Parcel. 
Not only did the Fence constitute a visible line marking the boundary between the 
adjoining parcels, but the Browns and their predecessors have occupied and used the 
Subject Property up to the Fence continuously since the 1940fs. (R. 0488.) Throughout 
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their ownership, in. Browns have used and m o d i f y .,4. • , :»« ' t rough 
*j • s Prop. r4vH K< ;;.. ,...;• •• f • v>s on the Subject 
Property, am; n :
 t:i * - hsred their livestock on the Subject property. 
«' » '" w - i he lii'uV' fi .»!•••() nut forth the expense and time necessary to make 
improvements to the irrigation ditch when it required cuUeriinr, i'l *r, I 1 I i 1 hmiitfh 
these actions, the Browns and their predecessor o* < npi.'d the Subject Property up to ill. 
visible l ence liiu i : browns have, at all times since its creation, considered 
the IVmv u\ h^ iiul maintained "the Fence as though it were, the boundary between (In, 
two parcels. (X 94.) The Browns did not original,) e:. - maintain the 
Fence for any purpose ot* iv, , i, J \ \ i * * • •ie between the Brown Parcel 
. lOh-1 OV.j Any subsequent benefit or use of the Fence, 
MI1 h as containing livestock, is purely one of coincidence or convenience,, and w d> im * i 
the original intent of the Browns or their predecessors. 
For the reasons set iorlh
 1ih»,«1 I iln, Binv\ ir and their predecessors in interest, 
have satisfied lie • IMNI ivqiinrment of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence because 
have occupied the Subject Property up to a visible line marked by a se*., ?s, 
at all times, treated as a boundary between 1k p •( »• ; "cumstances, 
Jorgensen clearly Knev uu uie ieiKe line served as J boundai \ 
marker beiwoen •- properties - and that the Bi evvns and others in the area consuu?* *• lu-
Fence as such a boundary. As such, the Trial Court erred to the extent that it did not rule 
in favor of the Browns on this element. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE BROWNS5 
MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS BECAUSE THE 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT ISSUE WAS TRIED BY IMPLIED 
CONSENT, THE MERITS OF THE ACTION WERE SUBSERVED, AND 
JORGENSEN WOULD HAVE SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE AS A 
RESULT. 
The Trial Court should have allowed the Browns' pleadings to have been amended 
to conform to the evidence pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides two separate situations in which 
a trial court can rule on issues not raised by the pleadings. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman 
Financial, 1999 UT 13, f8, 974 P.2d 288; see also UTAH R. Civ. P. 15(b). The first 
situation is mandatory, and "requires the trial court to consider issues not raised in the 
pleadings if the parties tried the issues by express or implied consent. Fibro, 1999 UT at 
Tf8, 974 P.2d at 291; see also UTAH R. Civ. P. 15(b). "A party may try an issue by implied 
consent by failing to object to the introduction of evidence related to the unpleaded 
issue." Fibro, 1999 UT at f 8, 974 P.2d at 291; see also England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 
340, 345 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that if a party fails to object to a motion to amend the 
pleadings, the trial court has full discretion to grant or deny the motion). 
The second situation is permissive, and applies only when a party actually objects 
to evidence at trial on the ground that it is outside the issues raised in the pleadings. 
-38-
Fibro, 1999 UT at %99 974 P.2d at 291. After this objection is made, the trial court may 
allow a party to amend its pleadings if (1) "the presentation of the merits of the action 
will be subserved thereby[;]" and (2) "the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense." 
Id. at %9; citing UTAH R. VIC. P. 15(b); see also England, 944 P.2d at 345. Ultimately, 
courts should be liberal in allowing pleadings to be amended so that cases may be fully 
and fairly presented on their merits. Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 
408 (Utah 1998). 
In the instant case, the first situation, which mandates Rule 15(b) amendment, 
applies because the issues relevant to determining whether the Browns had a prescriptive 
easement were prosecuted at trial without any objection by Jorgensen. To establish a 
prescriptive easement in Utah, a landowner must show a use that is (1) open; (2) 
notorious; (3) adverse; and (4) continuous for at least twenty years. See Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 
1998); Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah App. 1989), aff d, 788 P.2d 520 
(Utah 1990). Similarly, to establish boundary by acquiescence in Utah, a person must 
show (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (2) 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; (3) for a long period of time; and (4) by 
adjoining landowners. RHNCorp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ^[23, 96 P.3d 935, 941; Ault v. 
Holden, 2002 UT 33, ^16, 44 P.3d 781, 788; Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 
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1998); Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1996). The requirement that mutual 
acquiescence be for a long period of time has been interpreted in Utah to mean at least 
twenty consecutive years. RHN Corp., 2004 UT at f30, 96 P.3d at 943; Ault, 2002 UT at 
^23, 44 P.3d at 789; Orton, 970 P.2d at 1257. As such, both doctrines inherently require 
the parties to argue the following issues: (1) whether and how the Parties used and/or 
occupied the parcel of land in dispute; (2) whether said use and/or occupation was 
adverse or agreed upon; and (3) whether said use lasted for a period of at least twenty 
consecutive years. Therefore, each of the issues necessary to establish a prescriptive 
easement was presented and established at trial in the instant boundary by acquiescence 
case, and Jorgensen did not object to the introduction of that evidence at any time 
throughout the proceedings. Because Jorgensen failed to object in this regard, he has 
impliedly consented to the amendment of the Browns' pleadings to include the issue of 
whether the Browns had acquired a prescriptive easement in the Subject Property. See 
Fibro, 1999 UT at f 8, 974 P.2d at 291. As it stands, Rule 15(b) mandates that the Trial 
Court consider the Browns' prescriptive easement claim as if the same had been 
originally raised in the pleadings. 
The Browns also submit that, independent of the foregoing arguments, it is in the 
interest of justice and judicial economy to allow the pleadings to be amended and the 
prescriptive easement claim to be adjudicated. Even if Jorgensen had objected to the 
prescriptive easement evidence at trial (which he did not), the alternative requirements of 
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Rule 15(b) have been satisfied. 
First, presentation of the merits of the action would best be served by amending the 
pleadings to include the Browns' prescriptive easement claim. Allowing the Browns' 
pleadings to be amended would eliminate any duplication of the parties' resources 
because each of the requisite elements of a prescriptive easement was inherently 
addressed and tried concurrently with the elements of boundary by acquiescence, and 
would, therefore, not need to be repeated at a subsequent time, and at further expense to 
the parties. Second, Jorgensen's efforts to maintain his defense on the merits would not 
suffer prejudice in any way. Jorgensen knew of the Browns' claims to the Subject 
Property, and had already defended against said claims during the trial on the issue of 
boundary by acquiescence. Because the prescriptive easement issue was apparent during 
the trial on the elements of boundary by acquiescence, Jorgensen could not have suffered 
any form of prejudice or surprise had the Trial Court allowed the Browns' pleadings to be 
amended to include the prescriptive easement issue. 
Accordingly, the Browns have satisfied all of the necessary requirements under 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to amend their pleadings to conform to 
the evidence. The Browns' claim of prescriptive easement should have been formally 
adjudicated at the time of trial on the elements of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence. The Trial Court erred by not allowing the Browns to do so. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING JORGENSEN A 
JUDGMENT FOR COSTS BECAUSE JORGENSEN FAILED TO FILE A 
TIMELY MEMORANDUM OF COSTS PURSUANT TO RULE 54 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The Judgment for Costs awarded to Jorgensen at the conclusion of trial is invalid 
because Jorgensen failed to file a timely Memorandum of Costs pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In Utah, a party who claims his costs must within five days 
after the entry of judgment file with the trial court a duly verified memorandum of costs, 
UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2); Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616; Grindstaff v. Sheville, 
2003 UT App 141, 71 P.3d 179; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), and 
must also serve a copy of said verified memorandum on the adverse party within the same 
time. UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2); Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 318. "[F]ailure to satisfy the 
requirement for filing a verified memorandum of costs is fatal to a claim to recover costs 
under Rule 54." Lyon, 2000 UT at % 77, 5 P.3d at 637; Grindstaff, 2003 UT App at f2, 71 
P.3d at 179. This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the trial court with regard 
to granting an award of costs. Lyon, 2000 UT at f 76, 5 P.3d at 637. The Lyon case 
illustrates this straight-forward principle. 
At the conclusion of the trial in Lyon, the trial court issued its judgment in favor of 
the Lyons on July 11, 1995. Lyon, 2000 UT at f 77, 5 P.3d at 637. The Lyons, however, 
did not file a verified memorandum of costs with the trial court until July 26, 1995 -
fifteen (15) days after the entry of the trial court's judgment. Id. at f77. The court held 
that the Lyon's failure to file the verified memorandum of costs within five days of the 
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judgment pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2) prevented the award of costs in the matter. Id. at f77-
78. On appeal, the decision of the trial court not to award costs to the Lyons was 
affirmed. Id. 
The instant case is analogous to the situation in Lyons. In the case at hand, the 
Trial Court entered judgment against the Browns on August 2, 2004. (RI 0573.) As part 
of that judgment, the Trial Court awarded Jorgensen his costs "as may hereafter be 
established by a memorandum of costs and disbursements filed pursuant to Rule 54(d), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Id.) After receiving judgment in his favor, however, 
Jorgensen failed to file the requisite memorandum of costs within the five (5) day period 
mandated by Rule 54(d), and has still failed to file said memorandum of costs to the 
present date. Jorgensen even admitted that he failed to file pursuant to Rule 54(d), and 
that such failure to file was an error. (Appellee's Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. Disp. at 8.) 
As such, Jorgensen is in clear violation of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as well as that Rule's supporting case law. The award of costs granted to 
Jorgensen by the Trial Court should, therefore, be deemed invalid. 
VI. THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS INVALID INSOFAR AS IT 
PURPORTS TO ADJUDICATE ALL CLAIMS OF THE BROWNS AS 
WELL AS ALL CLAIMS OF ALL OTHER PERSONS WHO MAY CLAIM 
BY, THROUGH, OR UNDER THE BROWNS. 
The Trial Court's judgment is invalid to the extent that it is overly broad in scope, 
and precludes future claims in a manner that is incompatible with the doctrine of res 
judicata. Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata describes the binding effect of a 
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previous adjudication on a current adjudication. Culbertson v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 91, 44 P.3d 642 (Utah 2001). The doctrine 
of res judicata, often referred to as claim preclusion, "bars a party from prosecuting in a 
subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously." Culbertson, 2001 UT 
at Tfl3. "For claim preclusion to bar a claim in a subsequent action, (1) the subsequent 
action must involve the same parties, their privies, or their assigns as the first action, (2) 
the claim to be barred must have been brought or have been available in the first action, 
and (3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the merits of the claim." 
Id. Although claim preclusion restricts a party to a single adjudication with respect to 
another party, it does not operate to bar a claim against a different party, even if the 
subsequent action is related to the previously adjudicated claim. Serr v. Rick Jensen 
Construction, Inc., 743 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Utah 1987). "A judgment becomes res judicata 
only when the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties." 
SMP, Inc., v. Kirkman, 843 P.2d 531 (Utah App. 1992) (citing McCarthy v. State, 265 
P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1953)). The Serr case elaborates on this concept. 
In Serr, the Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against three defendants. Serr, 
743 P.2d at 1203. One of the three defendants then filed a third-party claim against the 
respondent. Id. At some point thereafter, the Plaintiff and the original three defendants 
settled the case prior to trial. Id. The Plaintiff then sued the Respondent directly, and the 
trial court granted the Respondent's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the basis 
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that the settlement of the initial action barred the subsequent action. Id. On appeal, the 
appeals court reversed the ruling of the trial court, and reasoned that because the 
subsequent suit between the Plaintiff and the Respondent involved different parties, the 
doctrine of res judicata did not apply, and the new litigation could move forward despite 
the fact that the claims were related. Id. at 1204. 
The judgment of the Trial Court in the instant case purports to adjudicate all future 
claims of the Browns, as well as all future claims of all other persons who may claim by, 
through, or under the Browns. (R. at 0571.) Such a ruling is improper, overly broad, and 
runs contrary to the established purpose of the doctrine of claim preclusion. The purpose 
behind the doctrine of claim preclusion "is to prevent one party from suing the same party 
in successive suits for claims that were or should have been brought in a single action." 
Id. at 1203. The judgment at issue, however, runs afoul of this purpose by barring all 
future claims of the Browns, or those claiming through them, irrespective of whether 
those future claims and/or parties are in any way related to the claims and/or parties 
already adjudicated in the instant case. 
Under the circumstances, there is no way of knowing whether the Browns, or 
others, will ever be involved in a subsequent action involving the Brown Parcel. 
Regardless of this possibility, however, the Browns, and those claiming by, through, or 
under them, cannot be barred from asserting their rights against other parties, including 
Jorgensen, even if those rights are related to the boundary by acquiescence dispute 
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currently between the parties, unless the specific requirements for claim preclusion have 
been met. Claim preclusion will only apply if the future claims purportedly barred by the 
Trial Court involve a subsequent ownership dispute over the same parcel of property at 
issue in this case. See Culbertson, 2001 UT at f 13. Beyond that, however, the Trial 
Court cannot lawfully prevent the Browns, or other parties, from asserting and defending 
rights to the Brown Parcel which might arise independent of the current cause of action. 
Moreover, the Trial Court in this case has only acquired subject matter jurisdiction 
over the boundary by acquiescence dispute between the Browns and Jorgensen. It has 
not, however, acquired subject matter jurisdiction over any of the future claims which the 
judgment purports to bar. This lack of subject matter jurisdiction further invalidates the 
Trial Court's ruling. See SMP, Inc., 843 P.2d at 533 (stating that res judicata will not 
apply to the prior adjudication of a claim unless the prior adjudicating tribunal had subject 
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim on its merits). The Trial Court in this case has 
only adjudicated the Browns' boundary by acquiescence claim against Jorgensen. It has 
no authority to bar all future claims of the Browns, or those claiming by, through, or 
under them, unless those future claims involve an action to quiet title in the same parcel 
of real property at issue here, between the same parties to this action, their privies, or their 
assigns. 
As it stands, the final judgment in this case goes far beyond the scope of the Trial 
Court's authority. The Court purports to bar potential claims over which it has not 
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acquired subject matter jurisdiction, and which are entirely independent of those claims 
adjudicated in the current litigation between the Browns and Jorgensen. For these 
reasons, the Judgment of the Trial Court should be held invalid to the extent that it is 
inconsistent with the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Browns respectfully request that the decision of the Trial Court be reversed 
and that title to the Subject Property be quieted in their favor. 
DATED this 2 ^ d a y of August, 2005. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
imes C. Jenkins 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and RULING AND ORDER 
MARILYN R. BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN, et al, Civil No. 010600152 
Defendants. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Three motions are before the court for decision: plaintiffs5 Motion for Summary 
Judgment; defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
the Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen. Neither side has requested oral argument, and plaintiffs' counsel 
has specifically advised the court clerk that he requests the court to rule based on the pleadings. 
The court has carefully considered the entire file, along with the applicable law, and being fully 
advised, rules as follows: 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen is DENIED for the reasons 
stated in the opposing memorandum. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed first, and disposition of that Motion 
essentially addresses the remaining two motions before the court. In considering plaintiffs' 
Motion, the court may not weigh the evidence, and all inferences and doubts must be construed 
in favor of the non-moving party. The court does not entirely agree that a quiet title action based 
on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence could only be decided (that is, in favor of the party 
seeking additional property not otherwise conveyed) by motion in the rarest of cases, but the 
trend as set forth in Utah appellate decisions is in that direction. Former Chief Justice Howe 
certainly suggested that boundary by acquiescence generally should be reserved for minor 
boundary adjustments, Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). More to the point, 
regarding motion practice, the very recent case of Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33 (Utah March 26, 
2002), held that "mere conversations between the parties evidencing either an ongoing dispute as 
to the property line or an unwillingness by one of the adjoining landowners to accept the line as 
the boundary refute any allegation that the parties may have mutually acquiesced in the line as 
the property demarcation." Id. at para. 21. 
In fact, once the Ault court identified conversations suggesting dispute, it deemed those 
conversations dispositive. The court not only reversed summary judgment for the parties 
claiming boundary by acquiescence, but instructed the trial court to quiet title in favor of the 
deed holders. 
Turning to this case, the court finds the Ault decision and its predecessors controlling. 
There is no uncertainty regarding the elements of boundary by acquiescence. Both parties state 
them correctly: (i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, 
(ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by 
adjoining landowner's. Ault, at para. 16, and cases cited therein). 
The undisputed facts in this case establish some, but not all, of the elements. 
Specifically, there can be no question about elements (iii) and (iv). The decisions are completely 
consistent that "a long period of time" means at least twenty years, but once twenty years is 
established, that should suffice. In this case plaintiffs have a couple of strong arguments. First, 
they claim a total time of 53 years, including 33 years of no objection from defendants 
predecessors, and just over 20 years without objection from defendant himself. The court finds 
that under almost any analysis, plaintiffs prevail on this point. The thirty three years without 
objection from defendant's predecessors satisfies the requirement. Defendant argues that the 
only evidence of absence of dispute is plaintiff Tom Brown's testimony, some of which dates 
back to when Mr. Brown was a boy, but the point is that there is, in fact, no other evidence, and 
nothing suggests that Mr. Brown's evidence is not competent. At the summary judgment stage, 
absent a valid Rule 56(f) affidavit, the non-moving party is held to the state of the evidence at the 
time of submission, and conjecture is not evidence. Accordingly, the claim of no dispute for 33 
years is unrefuted. 
The court was not cited to any law that says a successor is not bound by the acquiescence 
of his predecessor, but if he contests the binding nature of the actions of his predecessor, it hardly 
advances his cause to sit on his rights for twenty years without taking action. 
The court also finds that, independently of the action of Mr. Jorgensen's predecessors, 
there is no evidence before the court thaUie,actually disputed the boundary until just after the 
twenty year period passed. For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the long period of time 
element is satisfied. 
The is also no question as to element (iv), regarding adjoining landowners. Plaintiffs 
have clearly sketched the chain of title to all relevant parcels, and defendant's testimony is in 
accord. 
Plaintiffs' Motion fails, however, with respect to the first two elements. This is not 
because there is no substantial evidence to support plaintiffs' claims, but because defendant has 
also advanced competent and credible evidence to the contrary, particularly as to (ii), the 
requirement of a visible line marked by, in this case, a fence. This is a critically material point in 
this case, and given the strict appellate scrutiny suggested by Ault, this court cannot find, in the 
face of defendant's evidence and argument, that the fence in question met the necessary standard 
for any of the long periods of time identified herein. 
Finally, defendant's evidence as to occupation is the much weaker of the two sides at this 
point, but the court cannot say that the question is undisputed. 
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, but 
GRANTS partial summary judgment, as follows: as a matter of law, and based on the undisputed 
evidence before the court, plaintiff satisfies elements (iii) and (iv) of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, as follows: If the factfinder determines that elements (I) and (ii) are met, plaintiffs 
will not be required to prove the remaining elements at trial. 
For the same reasons, defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further Order is required. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2002. 
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LEE JORGENSEN; John Does 1-10; and other 
persons unknown claiming title or interest in the 
subject property of this action, 
Defendants. 
LEE JORGENSEN'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT 
OF LEE JORGENSEN 
Civil No. 010600152 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Defendant Lee Jorgensen, "Jorgensen", by and through his counsel of record, hereby submits 
the following Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' "Brown", Febmary 19, 2002 Motion to 
Strike Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen. 
The January 16, 2002 Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen, "Jorgensen Affidavit", was filed in 
Opposition to Browns' December 20, 2001 Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Jorgensen's January 18, 2002 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Browns' January 19, 2002 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lee 
Jorgensen, "Browns' Memorandum", asserts generally that the Jorgensen Affidavit does not meet the 
requirements of Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but does not refer to or point out what 
specific statement or statements in the Jorgensen Affidavit Brown finds objectionable. 
Browns' Memorandum cites Rule 602, U.R.E., requiring a witness to have "personal 
knowledge of the matter". That Rule also states that evidence of personal knowledge may consist of 
"the witness' own testimony". 
Paragraph 1 of the Jorgensen Affidavit satisfies that Rule. It specifically states Jorgensen 
"has personal knowledge of the matters hereinafter set forth". 
Browns' Memorandum asserts generally that the Jorgensen Affidavit states conclusions not 
supported by facts, contains hearsay contrary to U.R.E. 801 and irrelevant matter contrary to U.R.E. 
401 and contains "supposition and speculation". 
The Jorgensen Affidavit has none of those defects and meets the requirements of Rule 56(e) 
U.R.C.P. 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Jorgensen Affidavit state Jorgensen's ownership of Jorgensen's 
two separately described contiguous parcels of property adjoining Plaintiffs property—essentially 
affimiing Plaintiffs' allegations as to Jorgensen's record title. "There is no dispute that Jorgensen is 
the record title owner of the Subject Property." (See page 2 of Browns' February 19, 2002 
2 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment.)1 
Jorgensen's understanding^elief/state of mind with respect to his property line is obviously 
relevant. 
Regarding the old fence line, the Jorgensen Affidavit states facts observed by Jorgensen 
personally and facts concerning his personal understanding of the location of his Northeastern 
property line and its relationship to the old fence, irrigation ditch and "Ditch Road". 
Jorgensen Affidavit paragraph 5 states Jorgensen's obviously relevant, personal observation 
in 1978 of survey stakes along the downhill (Northeasterly) property line below the old irrigation 
ditch and Ditch Road. 
Paragraph 5 also states the information provided to Jorgensen at that time as to the property 
line being marked by the stakes—downhill from the Ditch Road which provided access to the 
property and was a significant reason why he purchased it. Jorgensen's understanding/belief/state of 
mind as to the location of the property line (not along the old fence) with respect to which he is 
competent to testify, is obviously relevant and not an inadmissible "conclusion" not supported by the 
facts. The factual basis for Jorgensen's understanding of the location of the property line is properly 
The paities respective recorded deeds and a numbei of earlier recoided instruments in their chains of title have been 
made Exhibits 6-24 to Joigensen's January 18, 2002 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Recorded deeds and recoided decrees of 
distiibution are "public lecords" admissible under Rule 1005, U.R E. Brown does not appeal to challenge what is shown 
by the parties lespective recorded chains of title, suivey's and othei documents but simply aigue such aie all melevant 
having been "humped" by the existence of the old fence upon which Plaintiffs lely to gain title to 6 94 acies of Joigensen 
property by means of Browns' (enoneous) interpietation of the legal dochine of boundaiy by acquiescence (See p 4 of 
Plaintiffs' February 19, 2002 Memoiandum of Points and Authorities m Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment.) 
3 
stated in his Affidavit. If Jorgensen's understanding of the location of his boundary (the same as his 
legal description) is a "conclusion" or "supposition or speculation" then Brown's assertion that he 
and his family always believed the fence was the boundary (See paragraph 6 of December 20, 2001 
Affidavit of Thomas E. Brown, "Brown Affidavit") is likewise an "conclusion" or "supposition or 
speculation" as are Brown's uncross-examined statements that he or his family "continuously 
occupied" up to the fence. (See paragraph 6 of the Brown Affidavit)2 
Paragraph 8 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states Jorgensen's observations that fence "remnants" 
were on the property at the time Jorgensen acquired the property, including his observation that the 
fences did not show evidence of having been maintained for many decades and the information 
received from agents of the realty company that the old fence remnants were within the subject 
property—information coinciding with the survey stakes and legal description. 
Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states that Jorgensen visited the property from 
time to time since 1978 until into 1994 and that in the course of those visits, Jorgensen observed no 
livestock Northeast of the fence remnants. Those are obviously relevant observations creating an 
issue of fact as to Brown's claim that he and his family "continuously occupied" the 6.94 acres. 
Paragraph 11 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states he did not personally operate livestock on his 
property but gave oral permission for others to do so. 
2
 Biown's Affidavit also asserts the Brown family laised crops, cattle and lawn grass "on the Subject Property" (Biown 
Affidavit, paiagiaph 6 and 8) Tliese "facts" as to "crops" and "lawn glass" aie counteied by the stark physical fact that 
most of the 6 94 acres beyond the fence is a fairly steep sagebrush covered hillside as shown by the Brown/Joigensen 
photographs made Exhibits to the Jorgensen Memoiandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in Support of Joigensen's Motion for Partial Summaiy Judgment—Exhibits 4 1, 4 4, 4 5, 5 2 2, 5 3.2 and 5 5 2 
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Paragraph 12 of the Jorgensen Affidavit contains Jorgensen's understanding that the fence 
remnants were meaningless. 
Paragraphs 13 through 15 of the Jorgensen Affidavit state that in 1994, discussions or 
conversations took place about sale/development which were apparently the impetus for Brown's 
efforts to rebuild the fence—efforts that Jorgensen personally observed in May or June of 1994, as set 
forth in paragraph 16 of the Jorgensen Affidavit. Jorgensen's observations in that regard are 
obviously relevant and, in fact, consistent with paragraph 10 of the Brown Affidavit, that Brown 
"improved the fence" June 1994-1996. 
Paragraph 17 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states that he visited his property again in the spring 
of 1999 and observed a wooden fence constructed by Brown obstructing the entrance to the Ditch 
Road and the new wire fence where the dilapidated abandoned fence had originally been placed. 
Those obviously relevant observations provided Jorgensen the impetus to send Brown the 
handwritten letter of protest dated July 30, 1999 which Brown has made Exhibit "F" to Plaintiffs 
December 20, 2001 Memorandum. 
Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Jorgensen Affidavit state that Brown refused to remove any 
fences in response to the Jorgensen July 30, 1999 letter, state Jorgensen's observations concerning 
the wood fence constructed by Brown when Jorgensen revisited the property, state Jorgensen's 
observations about a buried drain pipe and concerning what appeared to Jorgensen to be efforts on 
the part of Brown to obstruct the old Ditch Road on Jorgensen's property and describes where the 
fence was reconstructed in relation to the photographs taken by Jorgensen and also by Brown—all 
relevant matters concerning which Jorgensen is competent to testify. 
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Paragraph 21 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states the parties had a discussion after Jorgensen 
sent his July 30, 1999 letter to Brown and paragraph 22 states that Jorgensen did not agree with 
Brown that the old fence remnants were intended to be or should be regarded as establishing the 
property line. 
Paragraph 23 states Jorgensen's understanding that the old fence remnants did not mark a 
property line, (and were inconsistent with legal descriptions and Brown's own survey). 
Paragraph 24 states Jorgensen has never been uncertain as to his Northeastern property line. 
Paragraph 25 states Jorgensen's opinion that the original purpose of the old fence remnants 
was to provide livestock control—an opinion consistent with the net wire/barb wire nature of the old 
fence remnants. 
Paragraph 28 states Jorgensen's opinion as to the recent increased value of his 6.94 acres 
sought to be acquired by Brown and Jorgensen's need for access to the balance of his property 
provided by the old Ditch Road running through that 6.94 acres—again both relevant matters as to 
which he is competent to testify. 
Paragraph 29 of the Jorgensen Affidavit states that Jorgensen has paid all real property taxes 
assessed against the Subject Property since the time he acquired it—a matter also shown by public 
records. 
The basic relevant fact competently provided by the Jorgensen Affidavit is simply that 
Jorgensen was never in doubt as to the location of his Northeastern property line and so protested 
Browns' reconstruction of the old fence and effort to claim 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's property by 
reason of the old reconstructed fence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Jorgensen Affidavit satisfies the requirements of Rule 56(e) U.R.C.P. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen should be denied. 
DATED this 6th day of March, 2002. 
Ray G JVIartineau 
Tony Martineau 
David S. Cook 
Attorneys for Lee Jorgensen 
Served the foregoing by faxing and rMlTing^a^opy thereof to James C. Jenkins and Robert B. 
Funk, Olsen & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plafmtiffs, 1-435^2-2295, 88 WesrCenter Street, P.O. Box 
525, Logan, Utah 84323-0525 this 6th day if March, 2002. ^ 
n 
RayG Martineau#2105 
Anthony R Martineau #5859 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 486-0200 
Fax (801)486-0383 
David S Cook #0715 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone (801)292-7216 
Fax (801)292-7271 
Attorneys for Defendant Lee Jorgensen 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 




LEE JORGENSEN, John Does 1-10, and other 
persons unknown claiming title or interest in th< 
subject property of this action, 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF LEE JORGENSEN 
Civil No 010600152 
Judge Robeit K Hildei 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OF SAL I LAKE ) 
Lee Jorgensen, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says 
1. Affiant is the Defendant in this proceeding, a citizen and resident of the State of Utah, 
over the age of 21 years, has personal knowledge of the matters hereinafter set forth and makes this 
affidavit in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of Defendant's 
(Affiant's) Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. 
2. Affiant owns and holds fee simple record title to certain rural real property ("Property") 
adjoining plaintiffs' property located in Section 15, Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, Summit County, State of Utah. 
3. Affiant's adjoining Property consists of two contiguous but separately described parcels, 
the legal descriptions of which are set forth in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and also appear m 
certain title reports and mesne conveyances, copies of which have been attached as Exhibits to the 
memorandum ("Defendant's Memorandum") filed in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support of Defendant's (Affiant's) Opposing Motion for Paitia) Summary 
Judgment. 
4. A copy of the April 1, 1979 Special Warranty Deed conveying said property to Affiant 
and Dean W. Rowell ("Rowell"), and a copy of the February 13, 1986 Quit Claim Deed executed by 
Rowell conveying his interest therein to Affiant is attached as Exhibit "E" to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities m Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
(''Plaintiffs' Memorandum"). 
5. Prior to the time Affiant and Rowell acquired the Property, Affiant visited the Pioperty in 
1978 and observed several survey stakes along the Property's downhill (Northeastern) boundary line 
which in turn were downhill and Northeast from an old irrigation ditch and a roadway ("Ditch Road") 
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that ran parallel to thereto and Affiant was then informed by a person representing the seller Utah 
Title and Abstract Company, that such survey stakes marked the Property's Northeast boundary line 
and that both the old ditch and the Ditch Road, uphill from the survey stakes, were on the Property 
Affiant determined to purchase the Property in significant part because of the Ditch Road, which ran 
southeast from Brown's Canyon highway across the Property and up into the canyon (''South 
Canyon") south of the Brown's Canyon highway, which made the Property accessible to vehicles 
with high ground clearance 
6 The irrigation ditch has apparently long been used to convey water across the Property 
7 Affiant was provided with one or two old surveys before Affiant purchased the Property 
(present whereabouts of surveys is piesently unknown to Affiant) which showed that the 
Northeastern boundary of the Propeity was Northeast of both the irrigation ditch and adjoining Ditch 
Road 
8 At the time Affiant acquited the Property, there were remnants of two or three fences 
running generally North and South, and two or three fence remnants running generally from the 
Northwest to the Southeast along the hillside West and Southwest of the Northeast boundary of the 
Property, none of which fences showed any evidence of having been maintained for many decades 
Affiant was assured by agents of Stewart Grow Realty that these old fence remnants were all within 
the Property Affiant and Rowell weie purchasing 
9 From time to time, from 1978 until well into 1994, Affiant traveled the Ditch Road 
thiough the Property to the canyon in various vehicles and on foot 
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10 In none of Affiant's visits to the Property did Affiant observe that Browns had livestock in 
the area of the Property lying Northeast of the old dilapidated fence remnants 
11 Affiant has never operated livestock on the Property nor leased it for grazing However, 
Affiant gave permission through Ed Rogers to persons unknown to the Affiant for use of the Property 
for grazing livestock 
12 At the time and after Affiant purchased the Property, so far as Affiant was concerned, the 
fence remnants appeared to be meaningless 
13 In 1994, Affiant had discussions with others who were interested in acquiring/developing 
Affiant's property, particularly the portion thereof adjoining the Brown's Canyon highway and with 
representatives of Garff/Rogers who were interested in acquiring the right to use (and improve) the 
old Ditch Road foi access to Garff/Rogers' propeity located at or near the southern and of the Ditch 
Road 
14 Affiant understands that at that time, Craig McPhie and others then had discussions with 
Thomas E Brown ("Brown") concerning apparent survey results with which Brown disagieed and 
Affiant was advised efforts might be taken by Brown to build a fence cutting off access up the old 
Ditch Road 
15 In 1994, a developer named Warburton who proposed to assist Affiant in the 
development of the Property, prepared a document showing how the portion of Affiant's Property 
fronting the Brown's Canyon highway and West of Browns' property could be developed with a load 
providing access to the Brown's Canyon highway by means of the old Ditch Road A copy of said 
drawing is annexed to the Defendant's Memorandum 
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16 In late May or early June of 1994, Affiant and others went to the Property and observed 
that post holes were being dug by Brown and it was apparent that completion of a fence along the line 
of the post holes would completely block access into and across Affiant's Property up the old Ditch 
Road to the canyon Affiant is informed that dunng the next several months of 1994, Brown erected a 
(wood) fence along the Brown's Canyon highway 
17 Affiant next visited Affiant's Property in the spring of 1999 when Affiant learned that 
Ray McCarty had developed a subdivision called Elk Ridge North across the Brown's Canyon 
highway from Affiant's Property Affiant and Bill Gardner, a realtor, then visited Affiant's Property 
and observed that Browns had constructed not only a wooden fence obstructing the entrance to the 
Ditch Road but also a new wire fence where the dilapidated abandoned fence had originally been 
placed 
18 Affiant immediately sent Brown a registered letter dated July 30, 1999 demanding that he 
remove his fences from Affiant's Property A copy of said letter has been attached as Exhibit "F" to 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum 
19 Plaintiffs' refused to remove any fences, although Brown did call Affiant upon receipt of 
the letter and advised Affiant that there had been a misunderstanding and that Brown had hued 
suiveyor Kent Wilde to make a survey of Brown's property Affiant thereafter revisited the Piopeity 
to see what had taken place and observed that Blown had extended a wood fence East to his driveway 
and had apparently also buried a drain pipe in the old irrigation ditch It also appeared to Affiant that 
Brown had been endeavoring to obliterate all traces of the old Ditch Road 
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20. The new fence constructed by Browns in about 1995 across Affiant's property, traverses 
a hillside with sagebrush on both sides as shown by photographs taken by Affiant and also by Brown 
which have been made Exhibits to Defendant's Memorandum. 
21. The only discussion Affiant has ever had with Brown having to do with the fence was a 
conversation in which Brown requested a Quit Claim Deed conveying 6.94 acres of Affiant's 
Property lying Northeast of the new fence and offering in exchange a right-of-way narrow in width 
and in the scope of use up the old Ditch Road across the 6.94 acres. That discussion took placed after 
Affiant sent his July 30, 1999 letter to Brown. 
22. Affiant has not agreed at any time with Brown that the old fence remnants or any portion 
thereof, or the new fences constructed by Browns or any portion thereof, were ever intended to be or 
should be regarded as establishing or evidencing any boundary lines. 
23. Affiant has never had any belief or understanding that the old fence remnants which 
existed when Affiant acquired the Property were intended to mark or establish any boundary line and 
Affiant has always intended to own all of the Property within the legal descriptions contained in 
Affiant's deeds. The legal descriptions of Affiant's land adjoin Browns' legal descriptions without 
any gaps or overlaps as shown by the legal descriptions themselves and by the ownership plat map 
maintained by Summit County, a copy of which has been attached as an Exhibit to Defendant's 
Memorandum. 
24. Affiant has never been uncertain as to his actual Northeast boundary line of the Property, 
Affiant having been shown the same as outlined by several stakes in 1978 prior to Affiant purchasing 
the Property. 
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25. Affiant has no personal knowledge as to why fences evidenced by the old fence remnants 
were originally installed but the fact the old fence remnants included net wire strongly suggests the 
old fences were intended for sheep control—perhaps to keep sheep grazing in the area from coming 
down onto the irrigation ditch and Ditch Road, and/or to contain ewes and lambs during the lambing 
season. Affiant has been advised by Meryl Allen, a daughter of Tracy Wright, that the downhill flat 
portion of Affiant's property across the old Ditch Road had been used by Tracy Wright over the years 
as a lambing area. 
26. Since Affiant acquired his Property, the only use made thereof by Brown to Affiant's 
knowledge is trespassing to install the new fences. 
27. Browns have not offered to pay defendant any consideration for the 6.94 acres of 
Affiant's Property which Browns' own survey indicates lies to the Northeast of the old fence 
remnants and the new fence installed by Brown. 
28. The Ditch Road's access from the Brown Canyon highway through the Property together 
with the relatively flat portion of Affiant's Property lying along the Ditch Road, is the most valuable 
part of Affiant's Property and offers access to the remaining portion of the Property and the greatest 
possibility of residential and recreational development of the same and all of said portion lies within 
the 6.94 acres of Affiant's Property which Plaintiffs seek to take solely by reason of the old fence 
remnants. 
29. All real property taxes related to the Property since Affiant acquired the same have been 
paid by Affiant. 




Subscnbed and sworn to before me this 16th day of January, 2002 
Notary Public H I 
TAMARAFROISLAND . 
3098 Highland Dnve Suite 450 I 
Satt Lake City, Utah 64106 . 
My Commission Expires I 
March 15 2005 
*
 w^t£j3fJLJtah | Notary Public 
Served the foregoing by mailing a copy thereof the James C Jenkins and Robert B Funk, 
Olsen & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plaintiffs, 88 West Centei Street, P O Box 525, Logan, Utah 84323-
0525 this _ | $ __ day of January, 2002 
JA^M^k 
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Ray G. Martineau #2105 
Anthony R. Martineau #5859 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-0200 
Fax: (801)486-0383 
DavidS. Cook #0715 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-7216 
Fax:(801)292-7217 
Attorneys for Defendant Lee Jorgensen 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 




LEE JORGENSEN; John Does 1-10; and other 
persons unknown claiming title or interest in the 
subject property of this action, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE TO REAL 
PROPERTY IN LEE JORGENSEN AND 
DIRECTING REMOVAL OF FENCE/FENCE 
IMPROVEMENTS 
Civil No. 010600152 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
The above entitled matter was tried before the Court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on 
March 31 and April 1, 2004. 
The Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown appeared in person and were 
represented by attorneys James C. Jenkins and Robert B. Funk. 
Defendant Lee Jorgensen appeared in person and was represented by his attorneys Ray G. 
Martineau and David S. Cook, 
The Court heard and considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, took the matter 
under advisement and made and entered the Court's Memorandum Decision dated April 7, 2004, in 
which the Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth therein and ordered that 
quiet title be awarded to Defendant as in the recorded instruments and directed Defendant to prepare an 
order in compliance with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth the Court's ruling. 
By Objection to Proposed Order Quieting Title to Real Property in Lee Jorgensen and Request 
for Hearing dated April 14, 2004, Plaintiffs objected to the form of order quieting title in Lee Jorgensen 
prepared by Defendant. 
On or about June 10, 2004 Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motion to Amend Pleadings to 
Conform to the Evidence; Motion to Amend Findings of the Court; and Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Request for Hearing and a memorandum in support of the said 
motions. 
Defendant filed memorandums responding to Plaintiffs' April 10, 2004 objection and June 10, 
2004 motions and those matters were heard by the Court on July 12, 2004. 
By Ruling and Order dated July 15, 2004, the Court denied Plaintiffs June 10, 2004 motions for 
the reasons set forth in that Ruling and Order; ruled the Court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision 
amended to include the property description as set forth in Defendant's proposed order, finding such to 
be an accurate description of the properties involved, ruled that Plaintiff is to remove the fence installed 
by Plaintiff along the roadway and the improvements made by Plaintiff to the fenceline which has been 
in existence for many years and directed Defendant to prepare a new order with those modifications. 
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NOW THEREFORE, the Court now makes and enters the following judgment pursuant to the 
Court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision and the Court's July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order: 
1. Fee simple title to all of the following described real property should be and the same is 
hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen against and free and clear of all boundary by acquiescence 
and all other claims of Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown and of all claims of all 
other persons who may claim by, through or under Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown or 
either of them: 
PARCEL A: 
BEGINNING at a point that is due South 3896.809 feet and due East 19,394.098 feet from the 
Northwest corner of Section 18, Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Summit County, Utah (said Northwest corner bearing North 1°06'56" West from the Southwest 
corner and being the basis of bearing for this description) thence North 35°30' West 1641.209 
feet to a point on the Southerly right of way line of State Highway 196; thence North 43°42' East 
along said right of way line 1101.410 feet to a point of tangency with a 1095.916 foot radius 
curve; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve to the right through a central angle of 
40°55'31", a distance of 837.778 feet to a point on the West line of the Southeast quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base Meridian; 
thence leaving said right of way line South 2°28'33" East along said West line to the Southeast 
corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15; thence East along the 
South line of the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15 to the Northeast 
corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 15; thence South 2°30'40" East along the East 
line of said Southeast quarter 1297.974 feet; thence South 86° West 1922.645 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described parcels: 
Exception Parcel 1: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South, 
Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; running thence West 211 feet; thence Southeasterly 
703 feet, more or less, to a point on the Section line 671 feet South of the place of beginning; 
thence North 671 feet to the place of BEGINNING. 
Exception Parcel 2: 
A tract situated in the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows: 
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BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said 
Section 15; and running thence South 11.00 chains; thence North 47°20' West 16.5 chains; 
thence East 12.42 chains to the place of BEGINNING. 
PARCEL B: 
BEGINNING 4.7 chains West of the East quarter Section corner of Section 15, Township 1 
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 15.3 chains; thence North 9.5 
chains; thence South 58°10' East 18.02 chains, more or less, to the place of BEGINNING. 
Said real property, title to which is hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen, includes the 
following described 6.94-acre parcel of Lee Jorgensen's property which was claimed by Plaintiffs 
Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown in this proceeding under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence: 
Beginning at a point which is West 211.00 feet from the East lA corner of Section 15, 
Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South 
17°27'22" East 19.40 feet to a fence; thence South 64°52'21" West 25.75 feet along said 
fence to a gate; thence South 59°33'56" West 15.81 feet to a fence corner; thence South 
6°04'49" East 67.61 feet along a fence; thence South 3°31'35" East 28.89 feet along said 
fence; thence North 38°57'12" West 58.36 feet along said fence; thence North 70°47'24" 
West 53.17 feet along said fence; thence North 67°20'36" West 573.54 feet along said 
fence; thence North 67°15'37" West 356.37 feet along said fence; thence North 
67°04'47" West 279.80 feet along said fence; thence North 4 1 W 5 2 " West 581.67 feet 
to the Southerly right-of-way line of Brown's Canyon Road; thence along the arc of a 
curve to the right 167.18 feet (radius 1103.16 feet, long chord bearing North 60°25'19" 
East 167.02 feet) along said right-of-way to the Tom Brown deed line; thence South 
47°20'00" East 748.14 feet along said deed line, thence North 33.00 feet along said deed 
line; thence South 58°10'00" East 1189.32 feet along said deed line; thence East 99.20 
feet along said deed line to the point of beginning. Containing 6.94 acres. 
2. Plaintiff Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove the 
wood fence erected by Thomas E. Brown, Jr. along Brown's Canyon Road in a portion of the 
above described Lee Jorgensen property. 
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3. Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove the wire and 
fence post improvements installed by Thomas E. Brown, Jr. along part of the fence along the 
hillside in a portion of the Lee Jorgensen property. 
4. Defendant Lee Jorgensen should be and he is hereby awarded his costs of court 
incurred herein as may hereafter be established by a memorandum of costs and disbursements 
filed pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
MADE AND ENTERED this day of , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
Bruce C. Lubeck 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Quieting Title To Real 
Property In Lee Jorgensen And Directing Removal Of Fence/Fence Improvements was served upon the 
following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to said individuals at the following 
address this ^ - / day of July, 2004. 
James C. Jenkins 
Robert B. Funk 
OLSON &HOGGAN,P.C. 
88 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
^ T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and 
MARILYN R. BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10, 
and other persons unknown claiming 
title or interest in the subject 
property of this action, 
Defendant. 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
March 31 and April 1, 2004. Plaintiffs were present with James C. 
Jenkins and Defendant was present with Ray G. Martineau and David 
S. Cook. 
BACKGROUND 
The underlying law suit relates to a dispute over a boundary 
line. On May 30, 2001, plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and 
Marilyn R. Brown (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint seeking an order 
that they are the fee simple owners of certain land. They claim 
to be the sole owners because they have acquired the property 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The issue is 
straight-forward. Defendant owns the disputed land by deed and 
all recorded instruments. Approximately 53 years ago, Thomas E. 
Brown, Jr.'s father erected a fence on Defendant's predecessor's 
property and plaintiff and his predecessors have been using the 
property since then under the belief that the fence was in fact 
the recorded property line*. It was not, and so the issue is 
whether that use now amounts to acquiring the property under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
On June 14, 2001, defendant answered and filed a 
counterclaim seeking to quiet title in the property. Defendant 
claims to be the record owner of the disputed property. 
The parties filed motions for summary judgment and partial 
summary judgment. On April 6, 2002, the court, Judge Robert K. 
Hilder, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
Case No. 010600152 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: Aoril 7. 2004 
on the third and fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence 
standard. Specifically, the court concluded that as a matter of 
law the boundary was established for a long period of time, 
namely 53 years, and that there were adjoining properties. In the 
court's June 28, 2002 clarification the court stated that the 
remaining issues for trial are the first two prongs of the 
boundary by acquiescence standard, which are (i) occupation up to 
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (ii) 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
Defendant filed motions in limine in May, 2003, and the 
court issued its ruling on^  September 22, 2003. The court ruled 
that the burden is on Plaintiffs, who now bear the burden of 
showing boundary by acquiescence and that the burden of proof is 
by the preponderance of the evidence. The court also ruled it 
was premature for the court to decide what Brown may testify to 
concerning specific statements. The court concluded that 
Defendant's recorded deed is relevant as Plaintiffs would not 
need to prove a boundary by acquiescence claim if Defendant's 
deed did not show that the property was his but the first and 
second prongs of the test remain and sufficiency of Plaintiffs' 
evidence in support of those prongs will be decided at trial. 
The court also determined that boundary by acquiescence claims 
may proceed without meeting the requirements of the statute of 
frauds and that the statute of frauds does not apply to boundary 
by acquiescence claims. The court also ruled UCA 78-12-7 relates 
to adverse possession and does not apply to boundary by 
acquiescence claims. The court refused to apply any presumption 
that applies to adverse possession to boundary by acquiescence. 
The court also refused to quiet title without trial. 
At the close of plaintiffs' case defendant moved for a 
directed verdict under URCP, Rule 50. The court believes that 
when the trial is to the court the proper motion is under Rule 
41(b), a motion for a dismissal claiming plaintiff has shown no 
right to relief. The court took that matter under advisement and 
allowed defendant to present his evidence. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. 
LAW 
The law surrounding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
is confusing. The issues are between two adversaries and each 
has interests that are worthwhile. On one side is the desirable 
feature of being able to turn to recorded instruments to 
determine property rights and boundaries. On the other side is 
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the also desirable principle of allowing the peace and good order 
of society to be served by leaving at rest possible disputes over 
boundaries where there has been a recognizable physical boundary 
accepted as such for a long time period. This case highlights 
those two worthy, competing interests between what appear to the 
court to be good and decent people. 
It is the policy of Utah law under the cases to apply the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence restrictively, though it is 
not unjust in some circumstances to require property owners to 
live with what they and their predecessors have long acquiesced 
in. 
For a court to quiet title in a parcel of property on the 
basis of boundary by acquiescence the party claiming title under 
the doctrine must establish (1) occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period 
of time, and (iv) by adjoining landowners. If the party claiming 
title under the doctrine fails to establish any one of the 
elements the boundary is defeated. The court, the Honorable 
Robert K. Hilder, has previously ruled that the final two 
elements have been established by undisputed testimony. To show 
mutual acquiescence plaintiffs must show both parties recognized 
and acknowledged a visible line and that the parties acknowledge 
the line as a demarcation between the properties. Both parties 
must have knowledge of the existence of a line as the boundary 
line. This element serves the useful and practical purpose where 
the parties are seemingly content to recognize a marked line as a 
practical boundary between them. When the parties acquiesce they 
are precluded from claiming the boundary line is not the true 
line. The landowner must recognize and treat an observable line 
such as a fence as the boundary dividing the properties. The 
acquiescence may be tacit or inferred from evidence. Even mere 
conversation between parties evidencing an ongoing dispute or an 
unwillingness by one to accept the line refutes the allegation of 
mutual acquiescence. The purpose of a fence is relevant and may 
be considered and may be determinative because both parties must 
acknowledge a particular line to be the dividing line. If the 
fence was not intended as a boundary there cannot be acquiescence 
in that fence as a boundary line. If a fence is built for 
livestock control or some other purpose and not as a boundary, it 
is not a boundary by acquiescence. Occupation of land up to a 
fence is not sufficient if the adverse owner does not acquiesce 
in the fence as a boundary. Evidence of knowledge of recorded 
deeds and instrument is not relevant in a boundary by 
acquiescence case. See Ault v. Holden, 44 P. 3d 781 (Utah 2002); 
Edgell v. Canning, 916 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999); Wilkinson Family 
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Farm v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 1999); Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs own land adjacent to defendant's land in 
Summit County. The parties land is called the Brown parcel and 
the Jorgensen parcel. The parcels are off what is called Brown's 
Canyon Road, Highway 196, between Highway 32 and Highway 40. 
2. Near the north border of the Jorgensen parcel is a fence 
which runs along what is now the disputed boundary in a 
Southeasterly direction, roughly along the Southern border of the 
Brown parcel. It runs from Highway 196, commonly known as Brown's 
Canyon Road, to a point approximately 580 feet from the road, 
then turns more easterly and runs toward the Weber River for 
approximately 1200 additional feet. See exhibit 10 for the most 
accurate showing of the property lines established by deed as 
well as the fence and ditch relevant to this case. 
3. The fence was built by the father of plaintiff Thomas 
Brown, T. Edward Brown, in the mid 1940s, between 1943 and 1946, 
though there is some testimony it was built before that. 
Plaintiff helped his father build the fence, a cedar post and net 
and barbed wire fence that requires maintenance and repair on a 
regular basis. The fence has remained in the same basic position 
since that time, but plaintiffs have repaired and replaced some 
of it as recently as the mid-1990s. There has been ongoing wire 
replacement and the first approximately 580 feet from the road 
have been replaced completely in the mid 1990s, but the old cedar 
posts were left in place. The fence has been observable since its 
construction, though at various points it may have been leaning 
down or covered by sagebrush in places. Defendant testified 
contrary to that visibility, but the court, based on several 
other witnesses testimony, finds the fence has remained 
observable and open since the mid 1940s. Several neighbors and 
friends and relatives of plaintiffs so testified and some had 
been in the area and recall the fence from the 1940s. 
4. The recorded deeds and plats show that the fence goes 
across the Jorgensen parcel and encloses approximately 6.94 acres 
of land that is shown on the deeds and plats and by certified 
surveys as belonging to Jorgensen. That area is the ''subject 
property." There is no question that the fence is on land deeded 
to and platted as belonging to Jorgensen since 1979. The 
recorded property lines are not disputed by plaintiffs. In 1979 
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Jorgensen and a partner, Rowell, acquired the Jorgensen parcel 
and the partnership dissolved in 1986 and defendant acquired the 
parcel from the partnership and has owned it solely since 1986. 
The land was acquired, through a title company, from Tracy Land 
and Livestock (Tracy) who owned that land and much more in the 
area since the mid 1940s. 
5. T. Edward Brown died in 1951 and plaintiffs' family took 
over the land and have used it to graze cattle and grow hay and 
other crops since 1951. Plaintiffs took title in some of that 
property, approximately 17 acres, in 1971, and that property is 
now known herein as the Brown parcel. He built a house on a 
portion of the approximately 17 acre parcel deeded to him. The 
fence was always considered by plaintiff to be the boundary line 
and plaintiff believed fully that the fence was the property line 
to his property and has believed that since the fence was built, 
even before plaintiff took title to his 17 acre parcel in 1971. 
Before building the house, plaintiffs commissioned a survey which 
was done by metes and bounds, performed by Bush and Gudgell. 
That document shows in fact the same as the recorded instruments, 
before and after 1971, that in fact the property line was not the 
fence line. Plaintiff was legally aware of that metes and bounds 
survey but did not understand it showed a property line different 
from the fence line constructed by his father in the 1940s. His 
subjective intent and belief, which the court finds was not 
unreasonable, was that the fence erected by his father was his 
property line. 
6. As shown more fully on exhibit 10, the fence line is up 
hill from plaintiff's true property line. Defendant's property, 
where it adjoins plaintiffs' property, is largely barren and 
hilly and mostly sagebrush. Below that fence plaintiff and his 
family have used the property to graze cattle and sheep. There 
is an irrigation ditch that plaintiff has maintained and improved 
which is below, on the downhill side of, the fence. Plaintiff has 
also caused some of that ditch to be covered by constructing 
culverts. Below that ditch there is a drop off toward the 
plaintiff property. The fence runs from the Brown's Canyon road 
up the hill, southeasterly, and then toward the river. At about 
580 feet, it turns more easterly, toward the Weber River. No one, 
neither defendant nor his predecessors, have attempted to use or 
occupy the property below the fence line. The fence runs 
approximately 1900 feet, or .3 of a mile, and if considered as 
belonging to plaintiff, adds property consisting of 6.94 acres to 
plaintiff's 17 acre parcel. At the road, the fence is 
approximately 167 feet from the true property line, that distance 
expands to approximately 250 feet approximately 500 feet from the 
road, and it then decreased to approximately 69 feet at the far 
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south end. It is thus a "strip" of property somewhat irregular 
but averaging perhaps 175 feet wide and it is approximately 1900 
feet in length. That 6.94 acres is the disputed property. An 
irrigation ditch is in the strip, and that ditch originates at 
the river and flows northward, obviously downhill, toward the 
road and then under the road. 
7. On or about July 1, 1999, defendant wrote a note to 
plaintiffs telling them they had built a fence on defendant's 
land and it should be removed. Since at least that time the 
boundary line has been in dispute. Plaintiff immediately 
contacted defendant and they attempted to resolve the issue but 
were not able to do so. Plaintiff commissioned a survey shortly 
after that contact. That informal survey is consistent with the 
1971 metes and bounds survey that was accomplished so plaintiffs 
could build their home. Plaintiff was originally told in 1994 
that in fact the true property line probably ran through his 
home, but that was in error and the true line, as shown on 
Exhibit 10, is west of plaintiff's home. Plaintiffs have refused 
to remove the fence and filed this action to quiet title 
asserting the disputed land is owned by them under the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence. 
8. Defendant bought 195 acres in 1979 as an investment. He 
inspected the property and observed fence posts but the court 
finds the fence was visible. Defendant at that time was not 
aware by survey of the exact and true boundary line but he 
assumed the line was below the fence and irrigation ditch and 
utilized what he believed was a "road" on his property just below 
the irrigation ditch and envisioned that would be the access to 
his property. In fact the court finds it was not a "road" but 
was used to work along the irrigation ditch. It could be 
accessed from Brown's Canyon road but a fence and gate from 
Brown's property ran to the disputed fence approximately 500 feet 
from the road as shown on exhibit 10. 
9. The predecessors of defendant ran livestock on the land. 
There is no evidence Tracy ever saw the fence or knew of its 
existence. There was no evidence adduced whatever that Tracy 
used or occupied the land on the downhill side of the fence. 
10. Defendant took surveyors and potential buyers along that 
area of the ditch but the court finds that was not occupation of 
the land. 
11. Defendant, in anticipation of possible buyers of some of 
his land, commissioned a survey in 1994, and that survey showed 
that the true line was not the fence line. Defendant always 
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believed the true line was not the fence, which he claims he did 
not even see except for a few old leaning cedar posts, but that 
the boundary line was downhill by the ditch and by the Brown home 
where it was marked with a flag when defendant first inspected 
it. The survey he commissioned in 1994 showed he was correct 
about the true boundary line, that it was not the fence line. 
The surveys are consistent with all the recorded instruments and 
show the true boundaries as shown on Exhibit 10. That survey was 
done by one France, who talked with plaintiff about the results 
of that survey, along with the real estate broker McPhie. France 
told plaintiff that plaintiff's house was probably partly on the 
Jorgensen property. That was incorrect, but plaintiff was told 
that. 
12. Plaintiff erected a wooden rail fence along the Brown's 
Canyon Road, to replace a wire fence across the front of his 
property, but ran it across the "road" or disputed approximate 
167 feet to the disputed fence in the late 1990s. Plaintiff does 
not call that area by the Hitch, the disputed area, a "road" but 
the court finds vehicles could drive onto it before the wooden 
rail fence was installed, though it was not intended as a road. 
ISSUES 
Here, as found, each party operated in good faith. In 
actual fact the true boundary line was as shown on the recorded 
records, deeds and plats. There was a 1971 survey that showed 
the fence was NOT the boundary line, but that was not understood 
by plaintiff. Thus, the issue becomes difficult for the court. 
That is especially so since two recent appellate court decisions 
are somewhat in conflict. There are recorded documents and 
surveys showing actual boundary lines. The parties are 
constructively charged with that knowledge, thus each party knew 
the boundary line and there was no legal uncertainty though there 
was practical uncertainty by plaintiff. Defendant then did 
nothing, by word or deed, to object to a visible fence. The 
issue thus becomes whether that inaction as to a fence, which was 
erected for a purpose not shown by the evidence, but by inference 
was erected not to establish a boundary line but for some other 
purpose, amounts to mutual acquiescence in that fence as a 
boundary. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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1. Plaintiffs had constructive knowledge of the true 
property line since they commissioned a survey in 1971. Prior 
deeds and documents showed the true boundary line as well. Those 
instruments showed that the true property line, according to 
deeds and plats and surveys, was not the fence line constructed 
by plaintiff's father. Plaintiff believed, however, that the 
fence line was the demarcation of the property line. 
2. Defendant is the record title owner of the disputed land. 
He also had constructive knowledge of the true property line at 
least since 1994 when he commissioned a survey of his property. 
He had constructive knowledge since 197 9 when he obtained a deed 
with the property description. That 1994 survey showed the 
property line not to be where the fence was but the true property 
line was according to the deeds and plats of record. 
3. Plaintiff has operated under the assumption that the 
fence constructed in the 1940s by his father was in fact the 
property line. 
4. The fence has been open and notorious and visible since 
the 1940s. It has on occasion been in disrepair but has been an 
observable fence since that time. 
5. Plaintiff used and occupied the land as if it were his 
and was open and notorious about that use. The fence has served 
as an observable and open boundary for a long period of time 
between two adjoining land owners. The topography and terrain 
made the fence placement a practical place to erect a fence as it 
would keep cattle and sheep off of the irrigation ditch and the 
lower drop off and off of what was in the 1940s pasture land, 
until the home was built in 1971. Given the slope and the 
irrigation ditch and the terrain in the area the court infers and 
concludes that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock 
and keep grazing livestock of the predecessoi: owner from the 
Brown property. The fence was not intended as a boundary line 
demarcating the property. There has been occupation of the land 
by plaintiffs up to the fence. There has been no occupation by 
defendant or his predecessors below or east of that fence. 
Defendant's occupation, and that of his predecessors, has been 
only up to that disputed fence. 
6. There was no mutual acquiescence in the open boundary 
line of the fence. This area is rural and defendant visited only 
on occasion as he bought the land for investment purposes. He 
purchased 195 acres and had possible plans to subdivide the area. 
There was no acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. Defendant 
did not take any action to oust plaintiff and remained silent as 
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relates to plaintiff until 1999. However, defendant did 
commission a survey in 1994. To the court that indicates a lack 
of acquiescence. If acquiescence is, in the words of Ault v. 
Holden, "where adjoining landowners are seemingly content to 
recognize a marked line or monument not on the true line as the 
practical boundary between them," then the hiring of a survey to 
the court conveys the opposite of acquiescence. If defendant 
believed and acquiesced in the notion that the fence was the 
boundary, he would not have commissioned a survey in this rural 
area. That act, though not conveyed directly to plaintiff, shows 
a lack of acquiescence. That act showed an unwillingness to 
accept the fence as the property line. In fact, however, even if 
the surveyor, Wallace France, was not an agent of defendant, that 
fact of obtaining the survey was conveyed to plaintiff. Moreover, 
the court concludes it need not have been conveyed to the 
opposing landowner to evidence a lack of acquiescence, or 
unwillingness to accept the fence as a boundary line. 
Plaintiffs have to prove mutual acquiescence by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Plaintiff argued that unless defendant conveyed 
that lack of acquiescence to plaintiff there was acquiescence. 
The court disagrees. While most cases evidently show a dispute by 
a direct communication with the opposing landowner, the court 
concludes that any actions that show an unwillingness to 
acknowledge the fence as a boundary are sufficient to defeat the 
doctrine. The acquiescence includes plaintiff demonstrating that 
both parties "recognized and acknowledged" a visible line. Ault 
v. Holden, 44 P.3d at 13. Defendant's actions in commissioning a 
survey were inconsistent with an "acknowledgment" that the fence 
was the property line. There seems to be no good reason that the 
lack of acknowledgment is only effective if conveyed to the 
opposing landowner. The doctrine requires that there be an 
actual acknowledgment, and that the parties treat the fence as a 
common boundary between the properties. Telling others that the 
fence is not the boundary, or hiring a surveyor, seems to the 
court to defeat the idea that there is an acknowledgment in a 
boundary line. As mentioned, moreover, here plaintiff was aware 
in 1994 there was a dispute when France and McPhie talked to him 
about the property line being other than at the disputed fence 
line. 
Further, the seeming inaction of defendant was not shown to 
be a tacit approval of the fence as boundary line. The inaction 
of defendant and his predecessors was acquiescence in the fence 
line for some purpose, but plaintiff has not shown it was an 
acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary line. 
The court believes plaintiff's arguments seek to in effect 
reduce the elements of boundary by acquiescence from four to 
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three. Simple occupation of land, up to a visible fence or 
boundary, without more, is not acguiescence. Though acquiescence 
may be tacit, it must be more than has been shown here by 
plaintiff. 
As to the predecessor acquiescing, the court rejects 
plaintiff's arguments in that regard. First, plaintiff must show 
acquiescence, which requires a showing that the other landowner, 
defendant's predecessor Tracy, "recognized and acknowledged" the 
visible line. There may be an inference that Tracy, running 
livestock, saw the fence, but the court concludes that is 
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ("recognized") the fence, let 
alone acknowledged it as a boundary line. The four elements do 
not overlap. Failure to occupy by Tracy, coupled with occupation 
by plaintiff, does not amount to acknowledgment the fence is a 
boundary. 
7. The boundary by acquiescence elements have not been met. 
There has been occupation of the land by plaintiffs up to a 
visible mark (fence) for a long period of time, over 20 years, by 
adjoining land owners, but plaintiffs have not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there was mutual acquiescence 
by the parties in that fence as the boundary line. Defendant 
failed to oust plaintiff, but did not agree that the fence was 
the boundary. Moreover, given the court's conclusion about the 
action of defendant in 1994 amounting to a dispute because of a 
failure to acknowledge the fence as a line, there has not even 
been an undisputed period of 20 years since defendant's 
ownership. 
The court indicated the recent cases are confusing. In 
Wilkinson, a Court of Appeals decision, the court said 
specifically that knowledge of the true boundary is not 
irrelevant. However, that court then quoted language from a case 
that has in effect been overruled because it considered the 
objective uncertainty element and that has now been eliminated as 
an element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Utah 
Supreme Court said after Wilkinson in Ault that a landowner must 
recognize and treat an observable line as the boundary, 
"regardless of whether the^  landowner knows where the actual 
boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain." To this 
court that means that knowledge of the actual or true boundary is 
not relevant. Here, there was never any legal uncertainty as to 
the true boundary line but there was actual uncertainty. The 
court concludes that such facts as these do not allow the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to grant an interest in 
property. The knowledge of the parties as to the true boundary 
lines is not relevant under Ault since the elimination of the 
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objective uncertainty element. 
The appearances of this area, the terrain, and the nature of 
the land and its uses by the parties do not allow a resident to 
obtain land by merely constructing a fence and then merely 
because the absentee landowner does nothing to have the fence 
removed claim title to the area up to the fence. The court has 
no question that plaintiffs predecessors did not intend to 
^appropriate" the land in this way, nor is there any evidence the 
fence was erected for any improper purpose. The clear inference 
is that the fence was erected to contain livestock and protect a 
ditch, and not to establish a boundary line. The plaintiffs' 
predecessors' record deeds also showed the actual boundary lines 
of the properties. Plaintiff has not shown that defendant or his 
predecessors mutually acquiesced for 20 years in this fence as a 
property line. 
8. The statute of frauds does not apply in this case. The 
statute of frauds, UCA 25-5-1, allows creation of an interest in 
land by "operation of law." The doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is the operation of law. If plaintiff had prevailed 
in showing all elements of that doctrine an interest in land 
could be acquired by operation of law without a writing. 
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied. The court 
orders that quiet title be awarded to defendant as in the 
recorded instruments. 
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
DATE D t h i s _ 2 _ day of ,s$7/tf / , 2004. 
ted?, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK \<£V \>*s 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE^6^'CTCCP 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. et.al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN, et.al. 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 010600152 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Date: July 15, 2004 
The above matter came before the court July 12, 2004, for 
argument on a proposed order and on plaintiffs motion to amend 
the pleadings. The court tried this matter March 31, 2004, and 
April 1, 2004. The court issued a ruling and order and asked 
defendant to prepare an order. Defendant did so and plaintiff 
objected to that proposed order, defendant responded, and the 
court set the matter for argument. On June 15, 2004, plaintiff 
filed a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. 
Defendant opposed that motion on July 7, 2004, and plaintiff 
replied on July 9, 2004. The court briefly heard argument on the 
motion and took the matter under advisement. 
The court is of the belief that the order prepared by 
defendant should be signed with slight modification. 
The court's ruling was based entirely on plaintiff's claim 
to title of the disputed land based solely on a claim of boundary 
by acquiescence and defendant's counterclaim to quiet title. The 
trial was over who owns title to the land in dispute. 
Plaintiff now claims the court can and should allow the 
pleadings to be amended because other issues were tried by 
express or implied consent. Plaintiff now claims that the court 
can and should determine that the evidence established that 
plaintiff has a prescriptive easement in the disputed land. 
Plaintiff claims the evidence showed plaintiff and his family 
have used and maintained the disputed property and they thus have 
a prescriptive easement for that continued use. 
The court's ruling was NOT based on the doctrine of 
prescriptive easement. The evidence to be presented at a any 
trial concerning any boundary dispute on any theory, be it 
dealing with an easement, adverse possession, or boundary by 
acquiescence, would be similar. Evidence would be presented 
concerning actual title, surveys, deeds, use of the land and the 
manner of that use, and so on. The court does not view this trial 
as one where the parties agreed,- explicitly or implicitly, on a 
trial concerning prescriptive easement or any other cause of 
action other than title under boundary by acquiescence. That 
phrase "prescriptive easement" was not uttered during the trial 
to the court's recollection, and it certainly was not briefed nor 
argued, and the court did not make its decision based on the 
doctrine. Whether the evidence "supported" such a claim is not 
the question for the court at this point. It may well have 
support the claim had the claim been made. It may not. That is 
the problem and issue. Had defendant been given a chance to 
address and challenge the theory of plaintiff now advanced, the 
court has no idea what the facts would have shown and what legal 
conclusions may be drawn from the facts presented. Prescriptive 
easement mostly focuses on "use" of land. There was indeed 
testimony on use by plaintiff, but defendant did not focus on 
that because the focus was on who had title to the land. 
Defendant has the right to know what claims he is defending 
against. Defendant was defending against a claim of plaintiff 
that plaintiff had title to this property under a property law 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The court did not 
understand, and defendant did not understand, that the evidence 
was aimed at establishing an easement of any kind in favor of 
plaintiff. The evidence was presented by plaintiff and by 
defendant to convince the court that either plaintiff or 
defendant had title to the disputed land. The court decided who 
had title. The court did not attempt to nor did it decide 
anything else. 
Plaintiff filed this case in May, 2001, asserting title to 
land under one doctrine, boundary by acquiescence. Plaintiff 
could have alleged alternate theories of title and easement, or 
plaintiff could have amended the pleadings long ago. The court 
believes the matter could have been tried on alternate theories, 
but if so, defendant could have faced and challenged each or 
either. Defendant did not defend against a claim of easement and 
usage by plaintiff and the court did not decide such. Defendant 
did not amount a defense to the "use" and "continuous" aspects of 
prescriptive easement law because he did not know plaintiff was 
claiming that. Whether there are defenses to such facts as 
plaintiff could present is, of course, unknown. That is why the 
court cannot decide if plaintiff has a viable case for a 
prescriptive easement based on the facts the parties presented. 
The court believes it would be fundamentally unfair to allow 
plaintiff to now seek recovery of a different sort, on a 
different cause of action seeking certain permissive use rather 
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than title, from what was asked for in the pleadings. 
Accordingly, the court will DENY the motion to amend the 
pleadings. 
The court will also direct that defendant prepare a slightly 
modified order based on the trial. 
The ruling and order of the court may not have set forth the 
boundaries of the land but the evidence established without any 
real dispute where the deeds and surveys drew the property line. 
The court orders that the ruling and order be amended to include 
the property description as set forth in the proposed final order 
quieting title as the court finds that description is an accurate 
description of the properties involved. 
The court also did not indicate in its ruling formally that 
the fences put in place by plaintiff must be taken down. It 
seemed to the court that went without saying. The court has 
determined that the property line is according to the surveys and 
deeds in evidence. It makes no sense to allow plaintiff to 
retain fences plaintiff built on property belonging to defendant. 
The order requiring removal of the fence along the roadway, which 
fence was installed by plaintiff is to be removed by plaintiff. 
The improvement, by plaintiff, to the fence line in existence for 
many years is also to be removed by plaintiff. 
Defendant is to prepare a new order with the above 
modifications and the court will sign such order. 
The court has attempted to follow the law in this matter. 
The result is not one that appears "fair" in all respects, but it 
is one wherein the court has followed the law as best it can and 
the result follows. If the court believed that the law did not 
answer the questions presented and it could turn to equity, the 
result may be different. However, the court believes the legal 
principles set forth in its ruling and order are correct and this 
result follows. 
DATED this & - day of 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G m $ f e £ o ^ 
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